The (Ex) Washington Realist

"Europeans buy energy from Russia, yes, and then sell all sorts of goods and services right back. It is a mutually-beneficial relationship and it makes sense why Europeans wouldn't want to cut into a good thing."

I agree but I would also argue that both sides seem to be thinking short-term here. Europe needs to be more independent of fossil fuels and Russia needs to diversify its economy beyond energy.

"(In contrast, the U.S. spends a good deal of cash for its imported energy but doesn't seem to get reciprocal contracts back.)"

I think we still sell a lot of goods and services to the GCC countries. Our contracts for oil imports are also priced in dollars. The problem is that money to import energy should be paying for alternative energy here at home.

To me, the test for NATO is not whether economic business as usual continues. The question is whether military guarantees to members in eastern Europe are still credible.
 

"The question is whether military guarantees to members in eastern Europe are still credible."

Some might be. Poland and Romania have substantial armed forces, and enough depth to be defensible.

The Baltics didn't, don't, won't in the future. They're pure liability from a military point of view. And the recent unpleasantness in Georgia hasn't altered this situation one bit. So, the guarantee to Poland/Romania has credibility, because they have forces that would last long enough to be reinforced. Not the case for the Baltics.
 

David Billington, anonymous at 4.28:

Military guarantees to Poland and Romania are, to be blunt, redundant. Why should the Russians want to invade either country?

One can see potential problems arising from the presence of Russian minorities in the Baltics. But so far, there are no indications I have come across of any enthusiasm on the part of Russia for reincorporating these territories by force.

The dangerous situations remain Georgia and the Ukraine, but it is to put it mildly far from clear that Western military guarantees are a useful means of providing security in either case.

The military defeat which Georgia has just suffered was the result of the promise of guarantees, and the reality of military assistance, the combination of which tempted Saakashvili to behave recklessly -- not of the lack of guarantees and military assistance.

The danger to the Ukraine arises not because Russian troops are likely to swarm across the border to subjugate unwilling Ukrainians. It arises because in certain circumstances the inhabitants of the Crimea might decide that they no longer want to be in the same state as West Ukrainians, with whom they have very little in common.

Again, promises of incorporation in NATO make matters worse, rather than better. They both encourage Ukrainian nationalists to follow their Georgian counterparts in behaving recklessly -- and could just possibly make the Russians think that if the Ukraine is going to join NATO, it would be better if they took steps to forestall the possibility of Sevastopol becoming a U.S. navy base.

It is interest to look back at the exchange in Slate between Ambassador Jack Matlock and Strobe Talbott on NATO expansion back in 1998.

(See http://www.slate.com/id/3672/entry/24055/.)

Among Ambassador Matlock's observations:

'The political division of Europe ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany, and the removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. It ended bloodlessly because we convinced the Soviet leaders it would be in their interest to go quietly and we would not take advantage of their departure. If you have any doubts on that point, I would suggest you ask your staff to show you the memorandum reporting Secretary Baker's conversation with Gorbachev in early February 1990. I am not suggesting that there was anything legally binding in that conversation, but Gorbachev says in his memoirs that Baker's argument, which included the statement that the jurisdiction of NATO would not move eastward, convinced him to agree that a united Germany could stay in NATO.'

Note that Gorbachev made no attempt whatsoever to get the informal assurance from James Baker turned into a formal commitment. That was a mark of the degree of trust which very many Russians, including leading figures in the leadership and indeed military, had in the United States at that time -- the moral authority, one might say, that the United States then had.

In the event, Gorbachev turned out to be a gullible fool. We made him so.

What has been gained by this?
 

Nothing has been gained, as Patrick Buchannan has repeatedly observed.

But Talbot is wrong: "..'The political division of Europe ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain.." since the division of Europe dates back the division of Rome back in 395.

1600 years of division cannot be overcome by platter.
 

David Habakkuk,

"Military guarantees to Poland and Romania are, to be blunt, redundant. Why should the Russians want to invade either country?"

Moscow isn't going to tolerate US missile defenses in Poland.

"The military defeat which Georgia has just suffered was the result of the promise of guarantees, and the reality of military assistance, the combination of which tempted Saakashvili to behave recklessly -- not of the lack of guarantees and military assistance."

I agree. We have promised to defend Poland too. Russia will put more pressure on Poland to reject the US missile defense site. The Poles are gambling that NATO will stand firm. But all of the eastern Europeans must be unsettled by NATO's recent condemnation of Russia for its use in Georgia of merely "disproportionate" force against a country trying to exercise sovereignty over its territory.

"The danger to the Ukraine arises not because Russian troops are likely to swarm across the border to subjugate unwilling Ukrainians. It arises because in certain circumstances the inhabitants of the Crimea might decide that they no longer want to be in the same state as West Ukrainians, with whom they have very little in common."

There is strong evidence that Russia set a trap for the Georgians. The initiative to break up Ukraine could also come from Moscow. For reasons of strategic geography, Russia would have to detach eastern Ukraine as well if they want the Crimea.

"It is interest to look back at the exchange in Slate between Ambassador Jack Matlock and Strobe Talbott on NATO expansion back in 1998."

I have always thought that it was a terrible blunder on our part not to have accepted Russia's offer to join NATO in the 1990s and so bring the entire eastern bloc into the alliance on the same terms.

But in the long run Russia will lose if it tries to restore a sphere of intimidation around itself. It cannot win an arms race with the West and will someday face a more powerful China. Russia is losing population and running down the exportable resources on which its economy depends.

America's record of missed opportunities and narrow definitions of self-interest is a record for which we may pay heavily. In a world where neither America nor Russia are going to be the bipoles that they were during the Cold War, the two countries could have a lot in common. But we seem to be on a collision course right now.
 

"There is strong evidence that Russia set a trap for the Georgians."

There is no evidence Russia set such a trap. Pure conjecture.


"But in the long run Russia will lose if it tries to restore a sphere of intimidation around itself."

Russia has been losing for 15 years by compromising and making concessions and accomodating Western demands, few of which have been met with any reciprocity whatsoever.


"It cannot win an arms race with the West"

It dosen't need to.

All it needs is to divert Western investment, of which there is not enough right now, from energy independence to useless big-ticket weapons. Lockheed-Martin has been visibly drooling during this Caucasus crisis.

"and will someday face a more powerful China."

Would it serve US interests to see China dominate or conquer Siberia? Then the US will assist Russia, whatever Russia's previous behavior.

No US leverage there, David.


"Russia is losing population and running down the exportable resources on which its economy depends."

Indeed, and all these things were even more true back when Kozyrev was Foreign Minister.

Since Putin took over, Russia's birth rate is up about 20%, and the death rate is starting to decline. Looks like Russia is better off confronting rather than accomodating US demands.
 

rkka,

"There is strong evidence that Russia set a trap for the Georgians."

"There is no evidence Russia set such a trap. Pure conjecture."

How do you explain the timing of the embarkation of the Russian warship that went straight to Georgian waters? If Russia knew in advance that Georgia was going to move troops into South Ossetia, and remained silent, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Russia saw a trap and allowed the Georgians to walk into it.

"Russia has been losing for 15 years by compromising and making concessions and accomodating Western demands, few of which have been met with any reciprocity whatsoever."

None of the deeper problems to which I referred were in any sense caused by the West in the last eight years.

"All it needs is to divert Western investment, of which there is not enough right now, from energy independence to useless big-ticket weapons."

I suppose there is some truth to Lenin's dictum that capitalists will sell the rope to those who will then use it hang them. But to remain competitive, Russia needs to generate a high-technology society. Buying weapons that others made, useless or otherwise, won't do that. And Western investment in Russian energy won't happen until Russia clarifies and then sticks to the terms on which foreign investment in that sector is welcome.

Putin has tried to emphasize things that are forward-looking, especially in education. Russia's long-term prospects could improve if the economy and society change and if Russia focuses on its larger need for allies and friends in the world.

"Would it serve US interests to see China dominate or conquer Siberia? Then the US will assist Russia, whatever Russia's previous behavior."

Do you remember whose side we took in 1969? If our relations with Russia return to those of the Cold War, don't expect the American people to take Russia's side against China.

And even if we wanted to side with Russia, I'm not sure what difference it would make. Both America and Russia are relatively declining in relation to China and the rest of the world. A multipolar world will favor the strongest and risk the kinds of tensions that led to war in 1914. America needs to change as much as Russia if we are to avoid such a future. But both have to change.
 

rkka,

"All it needs is to divert Western investment, of which there is not enough right now, from energy independence to useless big-ticket weapons."

Sorry I just reread this and realized you were talking about investment in the USA, not Russia. You forgot to consider the possibility that we may try to invest in both. And if we do, we might reverse Lenin's dictum and do it with borrowed Russian and Chinese money.
 

"How do you explain the timing of the embarkation of the Russian warship that went straight to Georgian waters? If Russia knew in advance that Georgia was going to move troops into South Ossetia, and remained silent, then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Russia saw a trap and allowed the Georgians to walk into it. "

Oh, so if the Georgians planned to attack all by themselves and Russia detected it and prepared a response, then it's the Russians setting a trap.

How about just admitting that the Georgians started it, and got thumped.

"None of the deeper problems to which I referred were in any sense caused by the West in the last eight years."

Never said they were. They were caused by foolish Russian leaders seeking US approval rather than their country's interests. And that's fixed now.

"Putin has tried to emphasize things that are forward-looking, especially in education. Russia's long-term prospects could improve if the economy and society change and if Russia focuses on its larger need for allies and friends in the world."

They tried seeking friends and allies, extensively, and got nothing in return. They've learned that giving concessions dosen't create allies, just raises demands.

"Do you remember whose side we took in 1969?"

Yup. The USSR was the more powerful of the two then.

"If our relations with Russia return to those of the Cold War, don't expect the American people to take Russia's side against China. "

You talk of US relations with Russia returning to those of the Cold War. Considering US hostility to every manifestation of Russian interests and Russia's influence outside Russia's borders since 1992, I'd say only one of the two, Russia, stopped waging the Cold War. And frankly, since Putin's efforts to accomodate US efforts in Afghanistan did not produce a US desire for an alliance with Russia, I'd say that there's no basis for a US-Russia alliance in American politics whatsoever.

"And even if we wanted to side with Russia, I'm not sure what difference it would make. Both America and Russia are relatively declining in relation to China and the rest of the world. A multipolar world will favor the strongest and risk the kinds of tensions that led to war in 1914. America needs to change as much as Russia if we are to avoid such a future. But both have to change."

Russia has changed vastly, and has accomodated US demands for well-nigh 20 years. Yet, our hostility to Russia's influence and our demands for Russia to change remain unabated.

We will live to regret that.


And as for your second comment, the credit card is just about maxxed out, as seen by the trouble Freddie and Fannie are having getting cash. The rates they are having to pay are rising....
 

Friedman in the NYT, 8/19:

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/opinion/20friedman.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1219378475-zrbc9GWKJVk+pbOURn1jmw


He lays out the case for having opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s, then gives he reply of the proponents:

"No, said the Clinton foreign policy team, we’re going to cram NATO expansion down the Russians’ throats, because Moscow is weak and, by the way, they’ll get used to it. Message to Russians: We expect you to behave like Western democrats, but we’re going to treat you like you’re still the Soviet Union. The cold war is over for you, but not for us."

Those chickens are now roosting in Gori.

We had a chance for alliance with Russia. We decided we wanted to crush Russian interests and Russian influence more. If there are to be mutually beneficial US-Russian relation, we are now the ones who must convince Russians, against 15 years of accumulated evidence, that we are not their enemy.
 

"Oh, so if the Georgians planned to attack all by themselves and Russia detected it and prepared a response, then it's the Russians setting a trap."

If the Russians didn't want the Georgians to move, they could have issued a warning in time to deter it.

The question now is whether Russia has set limits to the behavior of its neighbors and will leave them otherwise alone, or whether Moscow will now try to rearrange the map of eastern Europe.

"They tried seeking friends and allies, extensively, and got nothing in return."

Did Moscow ever offer treaties to the former Soviet republics in which each partner would pledge to recognize and defend the sovereign boundaries of the others? I don't remember if the CIS was a formal defense treaty in this sense.

"And frankly, since Putin's efforts to accomodate US efforts in Afghanistan did not produce a US desire for an alliance with Russia, I'd say that there's no basis for a US-Russia alliance in American politics whatsoever."

Right now I agree. We blundered in the 1990s and our policies since then have not improved things. But if Russia restores a zone of intimidation around itself, it will be hard for America to take the initiative for better relations.

"Russia has changed vastly, and has accomodated US demands for well-nigh 20 years. Yet, our hostility to Russia's influence and our demands for Russia to change remain unabated." "We will live to regret that."

We already are living to regret past mistakes. The question is whether Russia can be secure, alone and surrounded by fearful neighbors. I think both Moscow and Washington are going to need each other eventually.
 

"If the Russians didn't want the Georgians to move, they could have issued a warning in time to deter it."

And how do you know this would have deterred the Georgians?

"Did Moscow ever offer treaties to the former Soviet republics in which each partner would pledge to recognize and defend the sovereign boundaries of the others? I don't remember if the CIS was a formal defense treaty in this sense."

And how do you know the US would have accepted this, instead of opposing it as an extension of Russian influence, to which the US has been unremittingly hostile?

"But if Russia restores a zone of intimidation around itself, it will be hard for America to take the initiative for better relations."

The whole point of the past 20 years of US-Russian relations is that the US will never take the initiative to improve US-Russian relations. All the concessions must come from Russia. And Medvedev/Putin are done with that game. The Russian government have concluded, correctly, that they have nothing to be gained by continuing to accommodate US encroachment where Russia has interests.

"I think both Moscow and Washington are going to need each other eventually."

And you think Moscow dosen't know that?? On the evidence of the past 20 years, Moscow has made collossal sacrifices of their international position, military power, influence, and interests, for precisely that reason. It is Washington that does not value the US-Russian relationship, choosing instead to be implacably hostile to Moscow's international position, military power, influence, and interests. The military move into Georgia reflects Russian despair as much as anything.

Again, if there are to be mutually beneficial US-Russian relation, we are now the ones who must convince Russians, against 15 years of accumulated evidence, that we are not their enemy.
 

"And how do you know this would have deterred the Georgians?"

I don't. But the warning would have drawn a much clearer line.

"And how do you know the US would have accepted this [a mutual defense treaty between CIS members], instead of opposing it as an extension of Russian influence, to which the US has been unremittingly hostile?"

In 1991-93, we raised no objection to the CIS. I can't imagine how or why we would have objected at the time to a mutual defense agreement between CIS members if the agreement was entered into voluntarily by all of the parties.

"The whole point of the past 20 years of US-Russian relations is that the US will never take the initiative to improve US-Russian relations."

I think perceived interests on each side will change 20 years from now if America is less inclined to intervene in southern Eurasia and if Russia faces a stronger and unfriendly China. Unfortunately, you may be right in expecting US-Russia relations not to improve for the time being.