Tuesday, July 06, 2010
Why the U.S.-India Relationship Stalls
All the rhetoric in the world about a "natural partnership" is not enough, unless there is a bureaucratic framework to nurture ties. My argument in the July 2010 issue of Pragati (The Indian National Interest Review) for developing a new concept of partnership.
In that same issue, Dhruva Jaishankar reaches a similar conclusion: "There were also no indications that the two sides had found a central organising framework for the relationship, one that might fill the vacuum left by the India-US nuclear deal. This gives the impression—perhaps unfairly—of the relationship being on steady auto-pilot."
In that same issue, Dhruva Jaishankar reaches a similar conclusion: "There were also no indications that the two sides had found a central organising framework for the relationship, one that might fill the vacuum left by the India-US nuclear deal. This gives the impression—perhaps unfairly—of the relationship being on steady auto-pilot."
Comments:
<< Home
This is an excellent article, but does ignore the larger picture of why the "strategic relationship" between India and the US worked for bush; both countries wanted to get something from the nuclear front.
India was always in the lead here, and after they got what they wanted it petered out.
Now we are back 20-30 years as the paki-hands take over again.
India was always in the lead here, and after they got what they wanted it petered out.
Now we are back 20-30 years as the paki-hands take over again.
Anonymous 2:38--
Your point is taken, but I think Nik is arguing a larger, structural question: even if the "Paki-Hands" weren't around, the relationship doesn't have a "bureaucratic home" in the USG that will develop it ...
Your point is taken, but I think Nik is arguing a larger, structural question: even if the "Paki-Hands" weren't around, the relationship doesn't have a "bureaucratic home" in the USG that will develop it ...
Anonymous 2:38--
Your point is taken, but I think Nik is arguing a larger, structural question: even if the "Paki-Hands" weren't around, the relationship doesn't have a "bureaucratic home" in the USG that will develop it ...
Your point is taken, but I think Nik is arguing a larger, structural question: even if the "Paki-Hands" weren't around, the relationship doesn't have a "bureaucratic home" in the USG that will develop it ...
I just do not see the issue.
Indians got some nuclear toys (in principle) and US has them boxed in with a virtual pesudo-NPT arrangement.
India lacks the national cohesion and the wherewithal to play Junior to US in the geopolitical arena. And against whom this (non-existent) power is to be deployed? The Chinese? (Fat chance of that), the Arabs and the Iranians (confronting more Muslim States - as though the confrontation with Pakistan is not enough), or helping in that sink-home of money called East and Northeastern Africa?
Oh, yes - Burma, finally something for Indians to do. Go for it boys!
Indians got some nuclear toys (in principle) and US has them boxed in with a virtual pesudo-NPT arrangement.
India lacks the national cohesion and the wherewithal to play Junior to US in the geopolitical arena. And against whom this (non-existent) power is to be deployed? The Chinese? (Fat chance of that), the Arabs and the Iranians (confronting more Muslim States - as though the confrontation with Pakistan is not enough), or helping in that sink-home of money called East and Northeastern Africa?
Oh, yes - Burma, finally something for Indians to do. Go for it boys!
we're in a system of hypotheticals, but if the paki-hands weren't around, and if we weren't funding India's #1 enemy, and if Holbrooke didn't think the answer to peace in the region was to give Kashmir to the Pakis, well, then we wouldn't have any problems.
Doesn't take away from what is an excellent piece of analysis.
Post a Comment
Doesn't take away from what is an excellent piece of analysis.
<< Home