Tuesday, September 01, 2009
What are We Prepared to Do (on Iran)?
John Bolton lays out a persuasive case today in the Wall Street Journal as to why sanctions against Iran won't work to alter the behavior of the current government when it comes to acquiring a complete nuclear infrastructure. As long as Russia, China, Japan, India and some European countries do not fully commit to "strong sanctions", then enough loopholes remain for Iran to mitigate the full impact of sanctions.
So what to do? Is preventing Iran from completing its nuclear infrastructure the guiding point of American foreign policy--and are we going to put this at the center of our bilateral relationship with other powers? Are we credible when we suggest that we might act unilaterally (with potentially unpleasant consequences for the interests of others)?
Are we having the equivalent of the discussion between Officer Malone and Elliot Ness in the Untouchables?
- What are you prepared to do?
- Everything within the law.
- And then what are you prepared to do? If you open the ball on these people, you must be prepared to go all the way.
Or not--if you think that containment works and is feasible.
So what to do? Is preventing Iran from completing its nuclear infrastructure the guiding point of American foreign policy--and are we going to put this at the center of our bilateral relationship with other powers? Are we credible when we suggest that we might act unilaterally (with potentially unpleasant consequences for the interests of others)?
Are we having the equivalent of the discussion between Officer Malone and Elliot Ness in the Untouchables?
- What are you prepared to do?
- Everything within the law.
- And then what are you prepared to do? If you open the ball on these people, you must be prepared to go all the way.
Or not--if you think that containment works and is feasible.
Comments:
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This is the inherent problem with being the worlds police department, as we have for nearly 100 years now. On a different scale, our nations faces the same damned if you do / damned if you don't reactions that law enforcement officers face everyday. I must say, as a LEO it does make me laugh a bit as others get a little taste of the life of an officer. Do you know your legal limitations and use every bit of your authority? You will be accused of harassment. Do you wait knowing what the outcome will be? You will be excoriated for not being there before the crime occurs. The world is a microcosm.
US is not the policeman of the world - that is not an apt analogy. Try racketeer.
# posted by 
: 1:07 PM
: 1:07 PM
Then there's that nagging suspicion that the same folks who were exercised by Iraq's WMD programs have mmerely swapped the "q" for an "n".
# posted by : 1:23 PM
: 1:23 PM
'Or not--if you think that containment works and is feasible.'
Certainly this is a crucial question. But you cannot begin to answer it, until you specify 1. what actions might be taken by the leaders of the Islamic Republic, in the absence of 'containment', that you want to prevent, and 2. precisely what measures of 'containment' you are intending, and how you are envisaging that they will effect the actions of those leaders.
What seems to be very poorly understood is that the answers to these questions are far from clear, in relation to the strategy of 'containment' as practiced against the Soviet Union. The figure generally portrayed as the principal intellectual architect of the strategy, George Kennan, has repeatedly claimed that he never believed that the Soviets had any aspiration to the military conquest of Western Europe -- or even to see communist governments come to power there.
His elaboration of this argument in a 1985 exchange of letters with the historian John Lukacs is available on the web. I quote from his account of how U.S. attitudes developed from 1948 on:
'There was, by now, a widespread understanding among Americans that Soviet intentions with regard to Europe were irreconcilable with, and in that sense inimical to, our own. But how did they intend to implement those intentions? Many Americans jumped quickly to the primitive assumption that the Soviet aim was to overrun the remainder of Europe militarily and then to replace the governments there, including the West German one, with Communist puppet regimes. But if one had tried to look at this assumption from Moscow's standpoint, particularly from Stalin's, its unsoundness would have become immediately visible. Stalin had very good reason for rejecting any such course of action.
'For one thing, it would have involved the unification of Germany under a single Communist government. But this was the last thing Stalin would have wanted to bring about. A German Communist regime, presiding over the entire population and commanding all the resources of the German state, could not have been expected to remain for long a puppet of Moscow. Such a Communist regime presiding over all of Germany would eventually occupy a position in world communism at least the equal of, or perhaps even superior to, that of any Russian Communist regime. But Stalin never forgot that to lose his pre-eminence in the world communist movement would be to endanger his position at home. He never doubted that the loyalty to himself professed by a great many senior Soviet Communists rested not in any great love for him personally but in the fear of him that he had himself inspired. And he had never been free of the fear that men of this ilk, chafing under the humiliations and dangers that attended their subordination to Stalin's tyranny, might find means of playing the international communist movement off against him, thus extracting themselves from his power and even occupying positions from which they could successfully oppose him.'
(See http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1995/8/1995_8_42.shtml.)
What Kennan also reiterates to Lukacs is his familiar claim that it was the views of his countrymen that changed, rather than his own. One cannot simply -- as Lukacs does -- accept this claim at face value. But equally, one cannot simply assume that his colleagues interpreted Kennan correctly.
It is important to note that in no sense is Kennan suggesting that Stalin's intentions were benign -- and that there are all kinds of possible Soviet actions which could have been deemed to need 'containment', other than an imputed urge to communise Western Europe. The point -- in relation both to the evaluation of U.S. Cold War strategy and dealing with Iran -- is that to plan effective strategies, one needs to start by seeking clarity as to what the objectives of the leaders of other states actually are.
Certainly this is a crucial question. But you cannot begin to answer it, until you specify 1. what actions might be taken by the leaders of the Islamic Republic, in the absence of 'containment', that you want to prevent, and 2. precisely what measures of 'containment' you are intending, and how you are envisaging that they will effect the actions of those leaders.
What seems to be very poorly understood is that the answers to these questions are far from clear, in relation to the strategy of 'containment' as practiced against the Soviet Union. The figure generally portrayed as the principal intellectual architect of the strategy, George Kennan, has repeatedly claimed that he never believed that the Soviets had any aspiration to the military conquest of Western Europe -- or even to see communist governments come to power there.
His elaboration of this argument in a 1985 exchange of letters with the historian John Lukacs is available on the web. I quote from his account of how U.S. attitudes developed from 1948 on:
'There was, by now, a widespread understanding among Americans that Soviet intentions with regard to Europe were irreconcilable with, and in that sense inimical to, our own. But how did they intend to implement those intentions? Many Americans jumped quickly to the primitive assumption that the Soviet aim was to overrun the remainder of Europe militarily and then to replace the governments there, including the West German one, with Communist puppet regimes. But if one had tried to look at this assumption from Moscow's standpoint, particularly from Stalin's, its unsoundness would have become immediately visible. Stalin had very good reason for rejecting any such course of action.
'For one thing, it would have involved the unification of Germany under a single Communist government. But this was the last thing Stalin would have wanted to bring about. A German Communist regime, presiding over the entire population and commanding all the resources of the German state, could not have been expected to remain for long a puppet of Moscow. Such a Communist regime presiding over all of Germany would eventually occupy a position in world communism at least the equal of, or perhaps even superior to, that of any Russian Communist regime. But Stalin never forgot that to lose his pre-eminence in the world communist movement would be to endanger his position at home. He never doubted that the loyalty to himself professed by a great many senior Soviet Communists rested not in any great love for him personally but in the fear of him that he had himself inspired. And he had never been free of the fear that men of this ilk, chafing under the humiliations and dangers that attended their subordination to Stalin's tyranny, might find means of playing the international communist movement off against him, thus extracting themselves from his power and even occupying positions from which they could successfully oppose him.'
(See http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1995/8/1995_8_42.shtml.)
What Kennan also reiterates to Lukacs is his familiar claim that it was the views of his countrymen that changed, rather than his own. One cannot simply -- as Lukacs does -- accept this claim at face value. But equally, one cannot simply assume that his colleagues interpreted Kennan correctly.
It is important to note that in no sense is Kennan suggesting that Stalin's intentions were benign -- and that there are all kinds of possible Soviet actions which could have been deemed to need 'containment', other than an imputed urge to communise Western Europe. The point -- in relation both to the evaluation of U.S. Cold War strategy and dealing with Iran -- is that to plan effective strategies, one needs to start by seeking clarity as to what the objectives of the leaders of other states actually are.
# posted by : 1:25 AM
: 1:25 AM
David - "The point -- in relation both to the evaluation of U.S. Cold War strategy and dealing with Iran -- is that to plan effective strategies, one needs to start by seeking clarity as to what the objectives of the leaders of other states actually are."
The trouble I see is that we do not have anyone of Kennan's stature to advise us about Iran. In the absence of full transparency, all one can do is assess public statements by regime leaders in the context of known behavior and capabilities.
Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own. If the outside world does nothing, then the problem will be decided at the regional level.
The trouble I see is that we do not have anyone of Kennan's stature to advise us about Iran. In the absence of full transparency, all one can do is assess public statements by regime leaders in the context of known behavior and capabilities.
Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own. If the outside world does nothing, then the problem will be decided at the regional level.
David Billington:
US is aiming to control access to world energy resources in the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia.
Iran is not controlled by US.
That is the gist of the problem between the 2 states.
Containment is a pipe-dream since its ideological dimension will have to go against Islam.
The view from Tehran is that without the nuclear capability, Iran will be attacked by her neighbour's with nuclear weapons.
US is aiming to control access to world energy resources in the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia.
Iran is not controlled by US.
That is the gist of the problem between the 2 states.
Containment is a pipe-dream since its ideological dimension will have to go against Islam.
The view from Tehran is that without the nuclear capability, Iran will be attacked by her neighbour's with nuclear weapons.
# posted by : 6:57 AM
: 6:57 AM
David, Anonymous at 6.47 am,
Unfortunately I am just heading off on holiday, so cannot give either of your comments the attention they deserve.
Obviously, without knowing the credentials of 'anonymous', I cannot judge whether his assessment of thinking in Tehran is accurate. For what little it is worth, my hunch would be that it is -- that the Iranian leadership has concluded that the dangers of not having a nuclear 'deterrent' far exceed those of seeking to acquire it.
This does not however imply that that the November 2007 NIE was necessarily wrong in arguing that the Iranians halted their nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 2003, or that they have restarted it subsequently.
The most dangerous period for a state seeking to acquire nuclear weapons is commonly when it is clearly going all-out for a nuclear capability, but does not yet possess one. In the case of the Soviets, it is commonly assumed that their initial atomic test, in August 1949, meant that they had a functioning nuclear capability at that date. In fact, the Soviet Armed Forces first acquired nuclear weapons in 1953 or 1954.
(See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3QUAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA18&dq=soviet+deploy+atomic+1954#v=onepage&q=soviet%20deploy%20atomic%2019541954&f=false.)
It was the Soviets, not the U.S., who were offering a 'window of opportunity' in the early Fifties -- alarmist estimates of the pace of the Soviet programme may have caused the U.S. to 'self-deter'.
Postponing any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would also allow the Iranians to concentrate scarce resources on developing counter-measures to U.S. -- and Israeli -- military power which would be available much more rapidly than a nuclear 'deterrent' is likely to be.
As to the question of whether the U.S. can live with an Iranian nuclear capability: while the account of U.S. strategic objectives by 'anonymous' can certainly be disputed, it brings out the key point -- that U.S. and Iranian objectives are interdependent variables. One also needs to take into account the potential risks and costs of the military option -- which are difficult to calculate precisely, but am inclined to think are very great indeed.
One also needs to take into account the strategic dilemmas of Israel. Much of the dangerousness of the current situation comes from the fact that Israel is genuinely under 'existential threat' -- but the real reasons for this are demographic. An Iranian nuclear capability, particularly coupled with the growing vulnerability of Israel to short-range rocket attack, genuinely compounds the demographic problem.
A mixture of genuine trauma and political opportunism then leads the Netanyahu government -- and its U.S. allies -- into portraying the Iranian government as having a Hitler-style willingness to take risks. But in doing so Netanyahu has boxed himself into a corner: until he can persuade the U.S. to get rid of the Iranian nuclear capability for him, all he will have done is greatly to exacerbate the demographic problem.
The end result of all this, in my view, is that the U.S. is pursuing maximalist objectives, without an implementable military option. Somewhere not far down the road, it is liable to be confronted by the choice of either accepting the costs and risks of military action, or appearing a paper tiger -- something which it is not usually prudent for a great power to do.
The danger of such a situation does not lie simply in the possibility that the U.S. will deliberately chose to accept the risks of the military option, out of the blue, as it were. It lies quite as much in the possibility that some quite minor event might spark a chain of events, in which the costs of not implementing the military option come to seem prohibitive. This is precisely the kind of possibility which, in the Cold War, worried sceptics about 'deterrence' theory -- including Kennan.
Unfortunately I am just heading off on holiday, so cannot give either of your comments the attention they deserve.
Obviously, without knowing the credentials of 'anonymous', I cannot judge whether his assessment of thinking in Tehran is accurate. For what little it is worth, my hunch would be that it is -- that the Iranian leadership has concluded that the dangers of not having a nuclear 'deterrent' far exceed those of seeking to acquire it.
This does not however imply that that the November 2007 NIE was necessarily wrong in arguing that the Iranians halted their nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 2003, or that they have restarted it subsequently.
The most dangerous period for a state seeking to acquire nuclear weapons is commonly when it is clearly going all-out for a nuclear capability, but does not yet possess one. In the case of the Soviets, it is commonly assumed that their initial atomic test, in August 1949, meant that they had a functioning nuclear capability at that date. In fact, the Soviet Armed Forces first acquired nuclear weapons in 1953 or 1954.
(See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3QUAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA18&dq=soviet+deploy+atomic+1954#v=onepage&q=soviet%20deploy%20atomic%2019541954&f=false.)
It was the Soviets, not the U.S., who were offering a 'window of opportunity' in the early Fifties -- alarmist estimates of the pace of the Soviet programme may have caused the U.S. to 'self-deter'.
Postponing any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would also allow the Iranians to concentrate scarce resources on developing counter-measures to U.S. -- and Israeli -- military power which would be available much more rapidly than a nuclear 'deterrent' is likely to be.
As to the question of whether the U.S. can live with an Iranian nuclear capability: while the account of U.S. strategic objectives by 'anonymous' can certainly be disputed, it brings out the key point -- that U.S. and Iranian objectives are interdependent variables. One also needs to take into account the potential risks and costs of the military option -- which are difficult to calculate precisely, but am inclined to think are very great indeed.
One also needs to take into account the strategic dilemmas of Israel. Much of the dangerousness of the current situation comes from the fact that Israel is genuinely under 'existential threat' -- but the real reasons for this are demographic. An Iranian nuclear capability, particularly coupled with the growing vulnerability of Israel to short-range rocket attack, genuinely compounds the demographic problem.
A mixture of genuine trauma and political opportunism then leads the Netanyahu government -- and its U.S. allies -- into portraying the Iranian government as having a Hitler-style willingness to take risks. But in doing so Netanyahu has boxed himself into a corner: until he can persuade the U.S. to get rid of the Iranian nuclear capability for him, all he will have done is greatly to exacerbate the demographic problem.
The end result of all this, in my view, is that the U.S. is pursuing maximalist objectives, without an implementable military option. Somewhere not far down the road, it is liable to be confronted by the choice of either accepting the costs and risks of military action, or appearing a paper tiger -- something which it is not usually prudent for a great power to do.
The danger of such a situation does not lie simply in the possibility that the U.S. will deliberately chose to accept the risks of the military option, out of the blue, as it were. It lies quite as much in the possibility that some quite minor event might spark a chain of events, in which the costs of not implementing the military option come to seem prohibitive. This is precisely the kind of possibility which, in the Cold War, worried sceptics about 'deterrence' theory -- including Kennan.
# posted by : 1:20 AM
: 1:20 AM
"The trouble I see is that we do not have anyone of Kennan's stature to advise us about Iran. In the absence of full transparency, all one can do is assess public statements by regime leaders in the context of known behavior and capabilities."
As for known behavior, recall that despite Iraq's use of WMD in the Iran-Iraq war, Iran neither replied in kind nor even acquired WMD of their own as a deterrent, due to a religious prohibition on acquiring and using such capabilities. That prohibition remains in force. Therefore, it is precisely due to Iran's past behavior that I am highly doubtful of the veracity of reports from the same intelligence organizations that were so catastrophically off the mark in their unfounded claims about Iraq's WMD programs as we were rushed into the present mess in Iraq.
"Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own."
This risk already exists, due to the Israeli nuclear program. Despite that risk, I still see no reason at all to believe the intelligence organizations that were so disasterously wrong about Iraq's WMD programs prior to our 2003 invasion of Iraq.
As for known behavior, recall that despite Iraq's use of WMD in the Iran-Iraq war, Iran neither replied in kind nor even acquired WMD of their own as a deterrent, due to a religious prohibition on acquiring and using such capabilities. That prohibition remains in force. Therefore, it is precisely due to Iran's past behavior that I am highly doubtful of the veracity of reports from the same intelligence organizations that were so catastrophically off the mark in their unfounded claims about Iraq's WMD programs as we were rushed into the present mess in Iraq.
"Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own."
This risk already exists, due to the Israeli nuclear program. Despite that risk, I still see no reason at all to believe the intelligence organizations that were so disasterously wrong about Iraq's WMD programs prior to our 2003 invasion of Iraq.
# posted by : 2:23 AM
: 2:23 AM
Anonymous 6:57,
"Containment is a pipe-dream since its ideological dimension will have to go against Islam."
Containment of Iran by the Arab states is what I meant to suggest. I think this would create a different dynamic.
"The view from Tehran is that without the nuclear capability, Iran will be attacked by her neighbour's with nuclear weapons."
This may be the perception but Israel hasn't done so and the Arabs are unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons unless Iran does so first.
"Containment is a pipe-dream since its ideological dimension will have to go against Islam."
Containment of Iran by the Arab states is what I meant to suggest. I think this would create a different dynamic.
"The view from Tehran is that without the nuclear capability, Iran will be attacked by her neighbour's with nuclear weapons."
This may be the perception but Israel hasn't done so and the Arabs are unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons unless Iran does so first.
David Habakkuk,
"Postponing any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would also allow the Iranians to concentrate scarce resources on developing counter-measures to U.S. -- and Israeli -- military power which would be available much more rapidly than a nuclear 'deterrent' is likely to be."
I believe Iran has acquired advanced air defenses from Russia but I don't have the impression that the funds to do so came at the expense of Iran's nuclear development. I would be surprised if they did. But I think you are right that nuclear weapons are probably years from actuality. Iran's missile program may be developing more quickly.
"As to the question of whether the U.S. can live with an Iranian nuclear capability: while the account of U.S. strategic objectives by 'anonymous' can certainly be disputed, it brings out the key point -- that U.S. and Iranian objectives are interdependent variables. One also needs to take into account the potential risks and costs of the military option -- which are difficult to calculate precisely, but am inclined to think are very great indeed."
The Pentagon appears to agree.
"One also needs to take into account the strategic dilemmas of Israel. Much of the dangerousness of the current situation comes from the fact that Israel is genuinely under 'existential threat' -- but the real reasons for this are demographic. An Iranian nuclear capability, particularly coupled with the growing vulnerability of Israel to short-range rocket attack, genuinely compounds the demographic problem."
The demographic balance could be problematical for Israel someday but the more immediate danger is that each side may become less secular and thus less open to compromise. An Iranian nuclear capability could embolden Israel's other adversaries but I don't think Iran would extend a nuclear umbrella to Hezbollah or Hamas.
"A mixture of genuine trauma and political opportunism then leads the Netanyahu government -- and its U.S. allies -- into portraying the Iranian government as having a Hitler-style willingness to take risks. But in doing so Netanyahu has boxed himself into a corner: until he can persuade the U.S. to get rid of the Iranian nuclear capability for him, all he will have done is greatly to exacerbate the demographic problem."
My own view is that Israel's strategic dilemma has to do with the nature of the military balance, not the demographic situation (which will continue with or without a nuclear Iran). Israel has survived with some U.S. assistance as long as conventional weapons have been the decisive factor. If both sides have nuclear weapons and if mutual deterrence cannot be assumed, then the situation clearly changes.
"The end result of all this, in my view, is that the U.S. is pursuing maximalist objectives, without an implementable military option. Somewhere not far down the road, it is liable to be confronted by the choice of either accepting the costs and risks of military action, or appearing a paper tiger -- something which it is not usually prudent for a great power to do."
This does seem to be the likely outcome. If it is, the question is what consequences will follow.
"The danger of such a situation does not lie simply in the possibility that the U.S. will deliberately choose to accept the risks of the military option, out of the blue, as it were. It lies quite as much in the possibility that some quite minor event might spark a chain of events, in which the costs of not implementing the military option come to seem prohibitive."
Exactly right.
"Postponing any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would also allow the Iranians to concentrate scarce resources on developing counter-measures to U.S. -- and Israeli -- military power which would be available much more rapidly than a nuclear 'deterrent' is likely to be."
I believe Iran has acquired advanced air defenses from Russia but I don't have the impression that the funds to do so came at the expense of Iran's nuclear development. I would be surprised if they did. But I think you are right that nuclear weapons are probably years from actuality. Iran's missile program may be developing more quickly.
"As to the question of whether the U.S. can live with an Iranian nuclear capability: while the account of U.S. strategic objectives by 'anonymous' can certainly be disputed, it brings out the key point -- that U.S. and Iranian objectives are interdependent variables. One also needs to take into account the potential risks and costs of the military option -- which are difficult to calculate precisely, but am inclined to think are very great indeed."
The Pentagon appears to agree.
"One also needs to take into account the strategic dilemmas of Israel. Much of the dangerousness of the current situation comes from the fact that Israel is genuinely under 'existential threat' -- but the real reasons for this are demographic. An Iranian nuclear capability, particularly coupled with the growing vulnerability of Israel to short-range rocket attack, genuinely compounds the demographic problem."
The demographic balance could be problematical for Israel someday but the more immediate danger is that each side may become less secular and thus less open to compromise. An Iranian nuclear capability could embolden Israel's other adversaries but I don't think Iran would extend a nuclear umbrella to Hezbollah or Hamas.
"A mixture of genuine trauma and political opportunism then leads the Netanyahu government -- and its U.S. allies -- into portraying the Iranian government as having a Hitler-style willingness to take risks. But in doing so Netanyahu has boxed himself into a corner: until he can persuade the U.S. to get rid of the Iranian nuclear capability for him, all he will have done is greatly to exacerbate the demographic problem."
My own view is that Israel's strategic dilemma has to do with the nature of the military balance, not the demographic situation (which will continue with or without a nuclear Iran). Israel has survived with some U.S. assistance as long as conventional weapons have been the decisive factor. If both sides have nuclear weapons and if mutual deterrence cannot be assumed, then the situation clearly changes.
"The end result of all this, in my view, is that the U.S. is pursuing maximalist objectives, without an implementable military option. Somewhere not far down the road, it is liable to be confronted by the choice of either accepting the costs and risks of military action, or appearing a paper tiger -- something which it is not usually prudent for a great power to do."
This does seem to be the likely outcome. If it is, the question is what consequences will follow.
"The danger of such a situation does not lie simply in the possibility that the U.S. will deliberately choose to accept the risks of the military option, out of the blue, as it were. It lies quite as much in the possibility that some quite minor event might spark a chain of events, in which the costs of not implementing the military option come to seem prohibitive."
Exactly right.
rkka:
"...I am highly doubtful of the veracity of reports from the same intelligence organizations that were so catastrophically off the mark in their unfounded claims about Iraq's WMD programs..."
The problem now is that there could be a true threat that no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past.
Me: "Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own."
rkka: "This risk already exists, due to the Israeli nuclear program."
The question is whether Iran is more secure with only Israel having nuclear weapons or with both Israel and the Arabs having them.
"...I am highly doubtful of the veracity of reports from the same intelligence organizations that were so catastrophically off the mark in their unfounded claims about Iraq's WMD programs..."
The problem now is that there could be a true threat that no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past.
Me: "Iran has to decide whether the risk of not having a nuclear deterrent is greater than the risk that its neighbors in the Arab world will acquire nuclear deterrents of their own."
rkka: "This risk already exists, due to the Israeli nuclear program."
The question is whether Iran is more secure with only Israel having nuclear weapons or with both Israel and the Arabs having them.
"The problem now is that there could be a true threat that no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past."
You're serious right? You think there's a real risk that "...no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past." Get real. I lie in DC. It is an unassailable matter of faith that Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Havig been catastrophically wrong about Iraq's WMD is practically a requirement for being taken as a "serious" analyst here.
You're serious right? You think there's a real risk that "...no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past." Get real. I lie in DC. It is an unassailable matter of faith that Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Havig been catastrophically wrong about Iraq's WMD is practically a requirement for being taken as a "serious" analyst here.
# posted by : 4:27 PM
: 4:27 PM
rkka,
"You're serious right? You think there's a real risk that '...no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past.' "
There is excellent reason to expect a number of Senators at least to set a much higher standard for evidence of some unacceptable activity before they again authorize the President to use force against another country.
"It is an unassailable matter of faith that Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons."
I don't think the CIA assessment of December 2007 could be read this way. But even if there is a consensus that Iran intends to acquire weapons, there is much more skepticism in the military of taking military action to stop them than there was in the case of Iraq in 2003.
"You're serious right? You think there's a real risk that '...no one in the United States believes on account of distorted intelligence in the past.' "
There is excellent reason to expect a number of Senators at least to set a much higher standard for evidence of some unacceptable activity before they again authorize the President to use force against another country.
"It is an unassailable matter of faith that Iran is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons."
I don't think the CIA assessment of December 2007 could be read this way. But even if there is a consensus that Iran intends to acquire weapons, there is much more skepticism in the military of taking military action to stop them than there was in the case of Iraq in 2003.
"There is excellent reason to expect a number of Senators at least to set a much higher standard for evidence of some unacceptable activity before they again authorize the President to use force against another country."
That is something very different, and unequivocally a Good Thing.
The puntditocracy/strategic analyst community is still very much persuaded that the Iranian government is trying to get nukes.
"I don't think the CIA assessment of December 2007 could be read this way."
Note how it was dumped on, just about universally.
"But even if there is a consensus that Iran intends to acquire weapons, there is much more skepticism in the military of taking military action to stop them than there was in the case of Iraq in 2003."
Not that I've seen.
That is something very different, and unequivocally a Good Thing.
The puntditocracy/strategic analyst community is still very much persuaded that the Iranian government is trying to get nukes.
"I don't think the CIA assessment of December 2007 could be read this way."
Note how it was dumped on, just about universally.
"But even if there is a consensus that Iran intends to acquire weapons, there is much more skepticism in the military of taking military action to stop them than there was in the case of Iraq in 2003."
Not that I've seen.
# posted by : 1:03 PM
: 1:03 PM
"Not that I've seen."
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in a televised interview in July what is probably a widely held view in the Pentagon:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4172565
The article below is out of date but goes into the potential difficulties of a war in more detail:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200412/fallows
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in a televised interview in July what is probably a widely held view in the Pentagon:
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4172565
The article below is out of date but goes into the potential difficulties of a war in more detail:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200412/fallows
But it is just one man's opinion, no? And not a consensus.
I thought the consenus, officially, was the NIE 2007 Report.
I thought the consenus, officially, was the NIE 2007 Report.
# posted by : 7:03 AM
: 7:03 AM
The JCS Chairman is the military adviser to the President. Although the President would normally consult with a range of people before taking military action, the advice of the JCS Chairman would carry the most weight on questions of military feasibility.
I think the answer is obvious. If you have a cancer, yoou surgically remove it
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