Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Russia: Tit-for-Tat Wins over Principle
So Russia has decided to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Does this mean recognition for Kosovo is not far behind?
Earlier this year, at the Russia-India-China meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia scored a major diplomatic coup when it got support for a common statement on Kosovo: that there could be no recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence and that UN Security Council Resolution 1244, with its call for "substantial autonomy" for Kosovo within Serbia was the path forward. Russia was seen in much of the "World without the West" as a defender of a key principle that is near and dear to the 140 countries or so that have chosen not to recognize Kosovo independence.
What does Russia gain? The situation on the ground hasn't changed by this act, but Russia's international standing may further erode. I can't imagine that this will go over well at the forthcoming SCO summit.
First, I think that Russia's decision is going to be a lot like Turkey's decision to recognize the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus when it self-declared its independence in 1983: an act no other state will follow. Not even Russia's allies and friends are going to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because they have issues with territorial integrity. China and India and South Africa aren't going to be happy with any widening of the Kosovo precedent.
Second, Russia's credibility in trying to resolve other frozen conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus is eroded, but perhaps that isn't really something that concerns either Smolenskaya or the Kremlin.
Getting "even" with Europe and the U.S. for their position on Kosovo doesn't to me seem a good reason for further weakening a key provision of the international order.
And Georgia, to its credit, has been consistent in its position on territorial integrity.
Earlier this year, at the Russia-India-China meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia scored a major diplomatic coup when it got support for a common statement on Kosovo: that there could be no recognition of a unilateral declaration of independence and that UN Security Council Resolution 1244, with its call for "substantial autonomy" for Kosovo within Serbia was the path forward. Russia was seen in much of the "World without the West" as a defender of a key principle that is near and dear to the 140 countries or so that have chosen not to recognize Kosovo independence.
What does Russia gain? The situation on the ground hasn't changed by this act, but Russia's international standing may further erode. I can't imagine that this will go over well at the forthcoming SCO summit.
First, I think that Russia's decision is going to be a lot like Turkey's decision to recognize the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus when it self-declared its independence in 1983: an act no other state will follow. Not even Russia's allies and friends are going to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because they have issues with territorial integrity. China and India and South Africa aren't going to be happy with any widening of the Kosovo precedent.
Second, Russia's credibility in trying to resolve other frozen conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus is eroded, but perhaps that isn't really something that concerns either Smolenskaya or the Kremlin.
Getting "even" with Europe and the U.S. for their position on Kosovo doesn't to me seem a good reason for further weakening a key provision of the international order.
And Georgia, to its credit, has been consistent in its position on territorial integrity.
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Nicholas Gvosdev:
An alternative view is that to maintain existing borders -- even if these are totally arbitrary constructions of imperial divide-and-rule strategies -- is simply impossible.
From an interesting article on the Georgian war by the Canadian anthropologist John Colarusso:
'I have been opposed to American policy toward Georgia since 1993 when I first became involved as a back channel diplomat on matters between Washington and Russia regarding the Caucasus.
'I told various and sundry in Washington repeatedly that to endorse the Stalinist boundaries of Georgia was to leave her chronically open to Russian pressure and manipulation. I might mention that this American policy endorses the machinations of one of history's great tyrants and mass murderers, and also repeats the errors of the mid-twentieth century of recognizing the false detritus of the British and other empires that rersulted in so much strife in Africa and elsewhere.'
(See http://circassianworld.blogspot.com/2008/08/some-thoughts-on-recent-fighting.html.)
It frankly amazes that a set of borders which were the product of arbitrary decisions by one of the most cynical and brutal imperialist statesmen ever is now regarded as having the force of holy writ in Washington and in London.
Be that is it may, however, what is patently unsustainable is the current American (and British) position -- that a unilateral abandonment of old boundaries by us is acceptable, but such an abandonment outrageous when done by others.
The only reason we think it acceptable is that we are deeply convinced that whoever happen to be our particular favourites in vicious ethnic disputes are angels of light, and their opponents demons.
Outside the West, people know this is nonsense. The inevitable effect of such a self-referential and narcissistic view of the world is the rapid disintegration of the moral ascendancy which the United States had back in the early Nineties.
Your distinguished contributor Anatol Lieven is currently in Pakistan. In an article in this morning's Times, he reflected on the way that the traditionally strongly anti-Russian Pakistan press is discovering what used to be known as 'moral equivalence':
'Is this because they have suddenly fallen in love with Russia? Not a bit. It is because when it comes to international lawlessness, bullying and aggression, they no longer see a great difference between Russia and America. The moralising of Western leaders, therefore, no longer cuts much ice in Peshawar - or anywhere else much outside the West itself.'
(See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4607471.ece.)
Why is that a country that once so widely admired -- indeed loved -- seems now to be principally concerned to ensure that it is feared? I really do not understand it.
An alternative view is that to maintain existing borders -- even if these are totally arbitrary constructions of imperial divide-and-rule strategies -- is simply impossible.
From an interesting article on the Georgian war by the Canadian anthropologist John Colarusso:
'I have been opposed to American policy toward Georgia since 1993 when I first became involved as a back channel diplomat on matters between Washington and Russia regarding the Caucasus.
'I told various and sundry in Washington repeatedly that to endorse the Stalinist boundaries of Georgia was to leave her chronically open to Russian pressure and manipulation. I might mention that this American policy endorses the machinations of one of history's great tyrants and mass murderers, and also repeats the errors of the mid-twentieth century of recognizing the false detritus of the British and other empires that rersulted in so much strife in Africa and elsewhere.'
(See http://circassianworld.blogspot.com/2008/08/some-thoughts-on-recent-fighting.html.)
It frankly amazes that a set of borders which were the product of arbitrary decisions by one of the most cynical and brutal imperialist statesmen ever is now regarded as having the force of holy writ in Washington and in London.
Be that is it may, however, what is patently unsustainable is the current American (and British) position -- that a unilateral abandonment of old boundaries by us is acceptable, but such an abandonment outrageous when done by others.
The only reason we think it acceptable is that we are deeply convinced that whoever happen to be our particular favourites in vicious ethnic disputes are angels of light, and their opponents demons.
Outside the West, people know this is nonsense. The inevitable effect of such a self-referential and narcissistic view of the world is the rapid disintegration of the moral ascendancy which the United States had back in the early Nineties.
Your distinguished contributor Anatol Lieven is currently in Pakistan. In an article in this morning's Times, he reflected on the way that the traditionally strongly anti-Russian Pakistan press is discovering what used to be known as 'moral equivalence':
'Is this because they have suddenly fallen in love with Russia? Not a bit. It is because when it comes to international lawlessness, bullying and aggression, they no longer see a great difference between Russia and America. The moralising of Western leaders, therefore, no longer cuts much ice in Peshawar - or anywhere else much outside the West itself.'
(See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4607471.ece.)
Why is that a country that once so widely admired -- indeed loved -- seems now to be principally concerned to ensure that it is feared? I really do not understand it.
# posted by 
: 11:35 AM
: 11:35 AM
Good points, indeed. ALl borders are to some extent artificial. Stalin also maintained the Versailles arrangements for the most part in Eastern Europe, including keeping Transylvania as part of Romania.
My fear is that border changes that occur in dribs and drabs lead to instability. Perhaps a new Congress of Berlin is needed--revise borders in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region just as it occurred in 1878, if we are going to make changes. Do it all at once and with all major powers signing off. But that's unlikely.
I fear the next flash points will be Nagorno-Karabakh--another possible war in the Caucasus--and what happens with Cyprus--which is now in the EU?
My fear is that border changes that occur in dribs and drabs lead to instability. Perhaps a new Congress of Berlin is needed--revise borders in Africa, Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region just as it occurred in 1878, if we are going to make changes. Do it all at once and with all major powers signing off. But that's unlikely.
I fear the next flash points will be Nagorno-Karabakh--another possible war in the Caucasus--and what happens with Cyprus--which is now in the EU?
Azerbeijan is not as reckless as Georgia, the situation should remain frozen.
Its the Ukraine that concerns me. Unless Tymoshenko manages to oust Yushtchenko, the escalade will continue.
Its the Ukraine that concerns me. Unless Tymoshenko manages to oust Yushtchenko, the escalade will continue.
Well, I guess the recognition of the SO&AB means that Kremlin finally left behind the idea to attract Georgia on its side by trading the breakaway territories for Tbilisi's friendship. Now the other considerations, like sentiments of the North Caucusus peoples (which has always, though to a varying degree, been a factor in that story) became more important. Simply the need to be able to keep more than a peacekeeping force in the enclaves to keep them well protected is probably a important factor now. I suspect that hastily sending an army across the mountains was a fairly nervous experience, the Russians may not want to risk it again.
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# posted by : 2:47 PM
: 2:47 PM << Home
