Friday, May 09, 2008
Dialogue Across the Atlantic
I am in Philadelphia attending the 8th annual Trans-Atlantic Editors' Roundtable. Just a few thoughts that have been heard around the table (and by no means exhaustive or even completely representative of the conversations):
--How do we manage a trans-Atlantic relationship when it is clear that while interests may converge in some instances, they don't in other areas? Do we choose to "agree to disagree" in the latter case, or try to find some sort of compromise solution?
--Can we even speak about the trans-Atlantic relationship as its own self-contained world, or do we have to acknowledge that other actors are present? Can we still talk about trans-Atlantic ties without reference to China and Russia?
--Is this statement still accurate in today's world--when the United States and the EU agree on an issue, this forms the basis for a global consensus; when the U.S. and the EU disagree, no such global consensus will be possible?
--What is the best way of making Russia a "responsible stakeholder" in both European and global affairs?
--Would a democratizing China be any more likely than an autocratic one to slow down its economic growth or work to limit its emissions and use of resources? Or, given the large number of poor still present, would a democratic China be even under greater pressure to speed up economic growth? (This in the context that China is building one new coal-fired power plant a week; claims it cannot afford clean coal technology for all of its power needs; and where each additional unit of GDP growth essentially requires 1 to 1.3 additional units of energy).
--Democrats claim to be more multilateral and more solicitous of European concerns, but given a renewed protectionist mood and a desire to revisit trade agreements, would the next Democratic administration clash with Europe over trade?
--Do we have a growing consensus on how to deal with climate change across the Atlantic or not? (TWR readers will recall that at last year's roundtable in London, the thesis was advanced that disagreements over climate change will be to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship what Iraq in 2003 was--a deeply divisive event.)
Just some thoughts.
--How do we manage a trans-Atlantic relationship when it is clear that while interests may converge in some instances, they don't in other areas? Do we choose to "agree to disagree" in the latter case, or try to find some sort of compromise solution?
--Can we even speak about the trans-Atlantic relationship as its own self-contained world, or do we have to acknowledge that other actors are present? Can we still talk about trans-Atlantic ties without reference to China and Russia?
--Is this statement still accurate in today's world--when the United States and the EU agree on an issue, this forms the basis for a global consensus; when the U.S. and the EU disagree, no such global consensus will be possible?
--What is the best way of making Russia a "responsible stakeholder" in both European and global affairs?
--Would a democratizing China be any more likely than an autocratic one to slow down its economic growth or work to limit its emissions and use of resources? Or, given the large number of poor still present, would a democratic China be even under greater pressure to speed up economic growth? (This in the context that China is building one new coal-fired power plant a week; claims it cannot afford clean coal technology for all of its power needs; and where each additional unit of GDP growth essentially requires 1 to 1.3 additional units of energy).
--Democrats claim to be more multilateral and more solicitous of European concerns, but given a renewed protectionist mood and a desire to revisit trade agreements, would the next Democratic administration clash with Europe over trade?
--Do we have a growing consensus on how to deal with climate change across the Atlantic or not? (TWR readers will recall that at last year's roundtable in London, the thesis was advanced that disagreements over climate change will be to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship what Iraq in 2003 was--a deeply divisive event.)
Just some thoughts.
Comments:
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1. To the extent that we can "agree to disagree" we should. There's no reason to open up old (and new) wounds on issues that aren't pressing. On those issues that we must deal with, compromise is the order of the day...although it is absolutely key to move forward on the issues where there is agreement.
2. We can and should discuss them, but we (the US) needs to be more cognizant of not only how far our European friends are willing to go, but realistic about what is ultimately achievable. Moreover, it is important that we also understand how our aggressive policies affect this dynamic.
3. Global consensus is a red herring. Things will still get done (or happen) without it. The key is the extent to which those events impact future issues of dispute. In most cases, more agreement is better than less, thus the U.S., like an intelligent chess player, needs to think 2, 3 or 4 steps down the road on a multidimensional level. This has proven rather difficult for this administration.
4. If by "responsible stakeholder" one means putting the feelings of other nations ahead of its own interests, then this will never happen. It takes two to tango and to the extent that we can predict the direction that Russia will go on a particular issue (something you're rather good at Nick), I think that we can avoid setting ourselves (and the Russians) up for failure on that front. See answer 1.
5. No. And why ponder hypotheticals that have no basis on the problems at hand...namely that energy prices (over the long term) are increasing at an enormously uncomfortable rate. What do we do about that?
6. Of course, especially if other growing European nations continue to look outside the EU for more lucrative trade arrangements. Whether Republican or Democrat, we have our preferred industries and companies as do the Europeans. This is neither a Rep. or Dem. issue...It's about our uncompetitive businesses vs. theirs.
7. No. While there will continue to be greater and greater agreement on the perceived underlying causes, what to do about it will still remain a contentious issue. The Europeans are content to pursue agreements that they will never be able to live up to...The U.S. is not so foolish. Under a McCain or Obama administration, there will be pull back from what the Europeans are proposing, especially if the economy continues to get hit by high energy prices (a likelihood).
There you are...answers to these most vexing of questions.
2. We can and should discuss them, but we (the US) needs to be more cognizant of not only how far our European friends are willing to go, but realistic about what is ultimately achievable. Moreover, it is important that we also understand how our aggressive policies affect this dynamic.
3. Global consensus is a red herring. Things will still get done (or happen) without it. The key is the extent to which those events impact future issues of dispute. In most cases, more agreement is better than less, thus the U.S., like an intelligent chess player, needs to think 2, 3 or 4 steps down the road on a multidimensional level. This has proven rather difficult for this administration.
4. If by "responsible stakeholder" one means putting the feelings of other nations ahead of its own interests, then this will never happen. It takes two to tango and to the extent that we can predict the direction that Russia will go on a particular issue (something you're rather good at Nick), I think that we can avoid setting ourselves (and the Russians) up for failure on that front. See answer 1.
5. No. And why ponder hypotheticals that have no basis on the problems at hand...namely that energy prices (over the long term) are increasing at an enormously uncomfortable rate. What do we do about that?
6. Of course, especially if other growing European nations continue to look outside the EU for more lucrative trade arrangements. Whether Republican or Democrat, we have our preferred industries and companies as do the Europeans. This is neither a Rep. or Dem. issue...It's about our uncompetitive businesses vs. theirs.
7. No. While there will continue to be greater and greater agreement on the perceived underlying causes, what to do about it will still remain a contentious issue. The Europeans are content to pursue agreements that they will never be able to live up to...The U.S. is not so foolish. Under a McCain or Obama administration, there will be pull back from what the Europeans are proposing, especially if the economy continues to get hit by high energy prices (a likelihood).
There you are...answers to these most vexing of questions.
ed:
On 4: Even the question itself reeks of hubris: consider US pursuing a destablized Middle East. Pot calling the kettle black!
on 5: What we do about it is to sanction and otherwise hinder oil & gas production in Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, and while at it wreck Iraq as well.
on multilateralism: This is not a "value" by and in itself. Blind pursuit of multilateralism has given other states power over US policies needlessly such as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear files.
The issue is this: What is the relationship between US power, EU power, and Russian power? Is the increase in one tantamount to a decrease ib the power of one or both of the others? And how does Chinese power figure in this?
On 4: Even the question itself reeks of hubris: consider US pursuing a destablized Middle East. Pot calling the kettle black!
on 5: What we do about it is to sanction and otherwise hinder oil & gas production in Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, and while at it wreck Iraq as well.
on multilateralism: This is not a "value" by and in itself. Blind pursuit of multilateralism has given other states power over US policies needlessly such as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear files.
The issue is this: What is the relationship between US power, EU power, and Russian power? Is the increase in one tantamount to a decrease ib the power of one or both of the others? And how does Chinese power figure in this?
ed:
On 4: Even the question itself reeks of hubris: consider US pursuing a destablized Middle East. Pot calling the kettle black!
on 5: What we do about it is to sanction and otherwise hinder oil & gas production in Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, and while at it wreck Iraq as well.
on multilateralism: This is not a "value" by and in itself. Blind pursuit of multilateralism has given other states power over US policies needlessly such as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear files.
The issue is this: What is the relationship between US power, EU power, and Russian power? Is the increase in one tantamount to a decrease ib the power of one or both of the others? And how does Chinese power figure in this?
On 4: Even the question itself reeks of hubris: consider US pursuing a destablized Middle East. Pot calling the kettle black!
on 5: What we do about it is to sanction and otherwise hinder oil & gas production in Venezuela, Sudan, Iran, and while at it wreck Iraq as well.
on multilateralism: This is not a "value" by and in itself. Blind pursuit of multilateralism has given other states power over US policies needlessly such as the North Korean and Iranian nuclear files.
The issue is this: What is the relationship between US power, EU power, and Russian power? Is the increase in one tantamount to a decrease ib the power of one or both of the others? And how does Chinese power figure in this?
I am sure that there was no consensus on this final question (EU power Russia power US power) at all--Nick, what's your take?
The power discussion was taking place, and no clear answers. Some Europeans there felt that the U.S. was mishandling Russia and not engaging Russia in such a way that its rise in power could be beneficial. There was some rumblings about the need for the U.S. and Europe to move more closely together, and so be able to offset China in the future.
"Some Europeans there felt that the U.S. was mishandling Russia and not engaging Russia in such a way that its rise in power could be beneficial."
Well, Europe's not doing any better, having given on their energy relationship with Russia to Balts and Poles, which they will regret if they don't take it back soonest!
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Well, Europe's not doing any better, having given on their energy relationship with Russia to Balts and Poles, which they will regret if they don't take it back soonest!
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