Monday, September 03, 2007

More on Iran: Outgrowth of the Roundtable

Last week's roundtable is still available for viewing on the C-SPAN site (Forum On The Challenges of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan).

Some of the points made last Thursday have been expanded upon in the media. Alexis Debat, for one, in charting options for the U.S. vis-a-vis Iran, noted that in the event of any confrontation the United States could not rely on small strikes but in fact was planning to decapitate Iran's military infrastructure. Sarah Baxter of the Sunday Times used his comments at the forum to introduce her article on the Pentagon ‘three-day blitz’ plan for Iran.

Meanwhile, Ray Takeyh, who outlined his proposal for "benign neglect" (noting that no other policy undertaken seems to have been successful) was counseling, in the Sunday issue of the Boston Globe, not to personalize the U.S. disputes with Iran or attribute them to the person of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He wrote:

Had Ahmadinejad not been elected, Iran's nuclear trajectory would not have been all that different. The desire to deter the United States and project power in the Middle East has pressed successive Iranian regimes toward the nuclear option. ...

Tehran's strategy is not necessary to export its Islamist revolution next door, but to promote Shi'ite allies who share its vision of the Middle East. Iran has sought to win over average Shi'ites with economic assistance, while its military aid is meant to ensure that the Shi'ite militias will have sufficient hardware to fight Sunni insurgents. This policy is hardly Ahmadinejad's innovation. ...

Since 1989, the year the war with Iraq ended and revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died, pragmatic considerations have gradually displaced ideology as the basis of Iran's international orientation. The reality remains that Iran's quest for nuclear arms and assertion of influence over Iraq makes strategic sense, especially in light of Iran's historic goal of regional preeminence.

Because Iran's ambitions are based on rational calculation, the United States can deal with it through dialogue. Only when the perception of an unreasonable Ahmadinejad is removed from the scene can Washington begin the painstaking task of diplomacy.


Confront or engage. These seem to be our two options. But one cannot do both, and one cannot realistically muddle between them (confront on one issue, such as the nuclear question, and hope to engage on others, such as stabilizing Iraq). Sooner or later, a choice has to be made.

Comments:
Nik, how much of this war talk is meant as disinformation to raise the heat on Tehran? Seems like we are seeing a repeat of the "Operation Bite" stuff you blogged about earlier, reports about imminent attacks, perhaps meant to force Europeans and Russians to take the diplomatic angle more seriously--given that this story you cite appeared in the London Sunday Times?
 
Thought a point Ray made that is often overlooked is that armed conflict with Iran is much more likely to occur accidently--and as a result of incidents in Iraq, particularly given the new orders given to US ground forces.
 
Debat is either engaged in misinformation or is being duped. This is more smoke and mirrors and is irresponsible to boot.
 
So what's the fuss? I would assume that the Pentagon draws up many contigency plans--that's what they do. So why is the existence of a plan equal "war is imminent"?
 
Doesn't Sarah Baxter have a history of writing these dramatic and apocalyptic pieces for the Times that never then pan out? Didn't she write back in Janaury that Israel was on the verge of launching strikes?
 
Ray Takeyh is one of the best analysts of Iran I have read but I am unsure of his assumptions here.

"Tehran's strategy is not necessary to export its Islamist revolution next door, but to promote Shi'ite allies who share its vision of the Middle East."

Is this really a distinction with a difference?

"Iran has sought to win over average Shi'ites with economic assistance, while its military aid is meant to ensure that the Shi'ite militias will have sufficient hardware to fight Sunni insurgents. This policy is hardly Ahmadinejad's innovation. ..."

True, but Iranian aid only began after the 2003 U.S. occupation of Iraq. Iran did not aid the Shias in the spring of 1991 when they also needed help. Current Iranian involvement in Iraq is an enormous departure from previous Iranian policy (reflecting the enormous change in Iraq itself).

"The reality remains that Iran's quest for nuclear arms and assertion of influence over Iraq makes strategic sense, especially in light of Iran's historic goal of regional preeminence.... Because Iran's ambitions are based on rational calculation, the United States can deal with it through dialogue."

The idea that Iranian policy is a rational calculation and that bilateral diplomacy with the United States can accommodate it presupposes that the regional order can achieve a new and sustainable equilibrium. If the Sunni Arab states will have only conventional weapons to face Iran's nuclear ones, and Shia militancy spreads, I doubt the Sunnis will see the rationality of all this. A less stable region with a stronger Iran may of course be inevitable.
But I wonder if U.S.-Iranian dialogue can be restabilized in a bilateral way in isolation from the impact of these changes on the larger region.

Regarding the current war scare, it might be pointed out that if America's policy of regime change has run its course and current U.S. threats are all bluster, then there should be less need for Iran to have nuclear weapons to deter the United States. On the other hand, if U.S. threats are credible signals of an intention to destroy the Islamic Republic before President Bush leaves office, then for Iran to develop nuclear weapons makes sense, but in that case we should be worried about the prospect of a new and larger war.

Personally I don't see how the United States could sensibly enlarge the present conflict, but it looks like the Iranians are taking the threat seriously enough to make a renewed effort to bring the IAEA and the Europeans over to its side. I agree that we will still have to see whether this diplomacy and the war scare amounts to anything.
 
David Billington:

Regarding your points:

- There is no distinction of substance when it comes to the role of religion in the Islamic state between Iraq and Iran. The only difference is that Mr. Sistani does not believe that the Shia scholars should be directly involved in the running of the government. But as far as the Muslim character of the state and her laws are concerned - the Iraq and Iranian leadership are on teh same page.

- In 1991 Iran risked being attacked by United States if she had intervened in Iraq on behalf of the Shia. Moreover, neither politically nor militarily Iran had the capability of intervening there. Iran had bigger fish to fry, such as recovering from the war with Iraq. I also like to point out that at that time, the Iraqi Shia were not ripe to accept Iranian aid. That may be contrasted with Hizbullah which came to existence after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and after it was clear that Amal could not protect the Shia of Lebanon.

- The Iranians took advantage of the US War & Occupation in the same manner that US took advantage of the USSR defeating NAZI Germany - opportunity knocked; fruits fell on their laps, etc.

- By "Sunni Arab states" I assume that you mean the following: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE. They cannot be defended with or without the sale of US armaments. Only US can protect them against any number of threats: Iran, Egypt, Iraq, India, and others.

- US-Iranian dialogue is over for the time being. Iran does not want or need anything from US. That is why US is forced into a containment strategy that may or may not work. Please note that all the usual supposed pressure points for change ib Iran (economy, jobs, repressive government etc.) applies even more so to these "Sunni Arab states". You are more likely to see a regime change in Saudi Arabia than in Iran.

- US cannot change the regime in Iran without resorting to nuclear weapons. Only Iranians can change that regime and that is still decades into the future. What teh US hope to achieve by attacking Iran is "to teach Iran a lesson" like Israel keeps teaching the Arabs. I should expect similar results.

- In regards to the Nuclear File; Iran & IAEA have created the mechanism to resolve all the IAEA outstanding issues by the end of the year. I also note here that the same date is mentioned in reagrds to the N. Korean programs. So the Nuclear File is effectively off the table. If US is going to attack it will be after 2008; perhaps around the time of State of the Union.

- Negogiations with Iran is possible but what is US willing to put on the table that is worth it to Iran? I observe here that because of EU sanctions on Iran, China has become the largest trading partner of Iran. As time goes on, this trend will continue and EU will have lost her leverage - just like US.

I think it will be a good idea to concentrate on the world after US-Iran War. A world in which Muslim States and NAM will be moving out of NPT....
 
Anonymous 12:35,

Thank you for your extended comments.

"- There is no distinction of substance when it comes to the role of religion in the Islamic state between Iraq and Iran. The only difference is that Mr. Sistani does not believe that the Shia scholars should be directly involved in the running of the government. But as far as the Muslim character of the state and her laws are concerned - the Iraq and Iranian leadership are on the same page."

By asking whether there was a distinction with a difference, I meant to ask whether Iran's backing of Shia militias in Iraq was not in effect exporting Shia empowerment, which to Sunni Arabs is a revolutionary thing.

"- In 1991 Iran risked being attacked by United States if she had intervened in Iraq on behalf of the Shia. Moreover, neither politically nor militarily Iran had the capability of intervening there."

I very much doubt the United States would have attacked Iran merely for supplying weapons and sanctuaries to the Shia Iraqis.

"I also like to point out that at that time, the Iraqi Shia were not ripe to accept Iranian aid."

The Shias were in an uprising and asked for U.S. aid. I don't see why they couldn't have used Iranian arms.

"- By "Sunni Arab states" I assume that you mean the following: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and UAE. They cannot be defended with or without the sale of US armaments. Only US can protect them against any number of threats: Iran, Egypt, Iraq, India, and others."

I think you would have to include Egypt in any assessment of longer-range Sunni Arab capabilities in relation to Iran. The current Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has an article on this. While the US is essential to the defense of the Gulf states, it is for this reason that these states may feel less secure if Iran becomes a nuclear power and the US becomes less eager to intervene.

"- US cannot change the regime in Iran without resorting to nuclear weapons. Only Iranians can change that regime and that is still decades into the future. What teh US hope to achieve by attacking Iran is "to teach Iran a lesson" like Israel keeps teaching the Arabs. I should expect similar results."

I do not think it is possible to be certain about the longevity of any regime that limits dissent. Where I think you are right is that it will be up to the Iranian people to make any changes.

"If US is going to attack it will be after 2008; perhaps around the time of State of the Union."

Do you think this is a serious possibility?

"- Negotiations with Iran is possible but what is US willing to put on the table that is worth it to Iran?"

The question is whether Iran can be secure without strong allies. America doesn't need Iran and will probably vacate the region if the politico-military cost of dependence on its oil becomes too high.

"I think it will be a good idea to concentrate on the world after US-Iran War. A world in which Muslim States and NAM will be moving out of NPT...."

I would prefer to imagine a world that avoids a US-Iran War. Regarding the NPT, the real need is to internationalize the fuel cycle (eg. the Russian proposal), which unfortunately may happen only if and when the detonation of a rogue nuke makes tighter international controls a necessity.
 
Nothing is going to happen. Saber rattling, etc. and posturing, but no one wants to send US economy on the skids before the presidential election.
 
Watch for 2002 to 2003 script repeated for Iran. Looming threat. Some movement at UN, but not sufficient. Administration taking UN resolutions saying there's a threat and we need to act. Ratcheting up pressure and hoping Iranians respond to provocation so as to create appearance of acting in self-deffense.
 
David Billington:

- About 1991; Iran was not going to risk anything. Iran accepted Arab and Kurdish refugees though.

- Shia of Iraq were not "ripe" in 1991 for the call of the Shia Religion since they had not been yet sufferred the Hussein's response nor the UN sanctions. Those sanctions eviscerated the Iraqi professional classes - the secular, both Shia and Sunni. Thus all fell back on their core identity - Islam (be it Shia or Sunni). That is why.

- Historically, both Egypt and Jordan (for different reasons) have been percieved as threats to Saudi Arabia. I think that conflating Egypt among your list is not warranted. And US has zeor interest in defending Egypt against Iran or any one else.

- Russia, China, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan all are clamping down on dissent. They are still around. And any way Iran is a more open society than any of the above except Russia. This is a red herring.

- Yes, as long George Bush is the President there is that possibility.

- Iran does not have any allies and she will do her best to address her security concerns. All I have seen since 2002 has been a slow moving gathering of storm against Iran. I have not seen any re-assurance by any one to the contrary.

- If you take the fuel cycle out of NPT, NAM will bolt. As far as the consortium idea is concerned Iran will never agree to a Russian-based one. Iran already is a share-holder in EuroDif and has received zero uranium. This is a pipe-dream.

- I do not believe that Iran will respond to US provocations - they know that for what they are.
 
Anonymous 3:53,

"- Historically, both Egypt and Jordan (for different reasons) have been percieved as threats to Saudi Arabia. I think that conflating Egypt among your list is not warranted."

The Bulletin article I cited notes the earlier rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and of course the Hashemite family once ruled the Hijaz. But Egypt and the Gulf states are close together today in fearing Iranian domination of the region. The Gulf states appear to have pledged to contribute funds to revive Egypt's civilian nuclear program, and four reactors are planned for completion by 2020.

"- If you take the fuel cycle out of NPT, NAM will bolt. As far as the consortium idea is concerned Iran will never agree to a Russian-based one. Iran already is a share-holder in EuroDif and has received zero uranium. This is a pipe-dream."

Would a more truly international arrangement be acceptable to Iran? What nations would Iran trust to run an internationalized fuel cycle?
 
I don't know whether a truly international arrangement would be acceptable to Iran, but that is the genesis of the Scowcroft proposal last year.
 
The fuel-cycle has to be on the Iranian soil; nothing else will do. Moreover, any incentives to Iran has to be delivered in short to medium term - no pie-in-the-sky type of arrangement will be accepted by Iran.

Anyway, the fuel-cycle is only one of the issues between US & EU on one side and Iran on the other side.

There is the issue of the heavy water reactor and the knowledge gianed in building one.

There is Hizbullah.

There is Iraq.

There is Hamas.

There is Afghanistan.

There is human rights.

There is pipe-lines from Central Asia.

There is the issue of security in Persian Gulf.

As you can see the list is quite long and the issues are complex.

But US & EU confrontation is a better price to pay than alternatives.

US has leveraged herself out of Iran, EU Is following suite. If the present treand continue, speacially in the light of possible US attack on Iran, in about 10 years EU will have also sanctioned herself out of influence in Iran. EU might as well pack her embassies in Tehran now and go home.
 
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