The (Ex) Washington Realist

Jun Okumura raises a justifiable complaint: in all of these discussions about the future of international relations, where is Japan? At the trans-Atlantic editors' roundtable, at the sessions I attended, China and India were mentioned in several contexts but Japan came up only once: in a discussion about energy security.

Japan is still the world's second largest holder of dollars (after China but before Russia, in the third position) but it remains taken for granted in Washington that Japan will use its dollar reserves to support U.S. objectives--whereas one must be more concerned about Beijing's (or Moscow's) intentions. There is also an assumption that, in strategic terms, Japan has "nowhere else to go" other than to remain in Washington's tight embrace, especially when faced with an unpredictable North Korea and a rising China.

The last major piece in The National Interest on Japan was Chris Preble's A Plea for Normalcy which appeared in the September/October 2006 issue. I've reproduced below the concluding paragraphs. Is this the direction of U.S. - Japan relations for the future?


Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future, more serious challenges to the regional security order. Japan's lingering hostility toward and suspicion of North Korea in the near term pales in comparison with its medium- to long-term concerns of a rising China. The trajectory of China's rise to regional prominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The open question is whether all three countries will be able to establish a new strategic balance or whether competition for influence in East Asia will lead to a clash that could threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people on both sides of the Pacific.

Common economic interests within Asia may lead to China's peaceful integration into the region. Or China could turn away from its current course of political and economic liberalization and revert to economic autarchy imposed by military force. It is even possible that China could become a revisionist power, no longer content to accept regional security configurations in their present form. That could occur even if the PRC holds to a course of economic reform.

Against those unlikely but dangerous possibilities, Japan's neighbors should welcome a potential counterweight to a rising China. Many already do. Attitudes toward Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Filipinos and Malays much more favorably disposed than are Koreans to the notion of a wider security role for Japan. These attitudes could evolve further if China's behavior grows more threatening.

The decades-long U.S.-Japan strategic partnership is changing. Americans are becoming increasingly anxious about the costs and risks of our permanent global military presence. We welcome changes that will allow the U.S. military to step back from its role as the world's policeman, and are looking for ways to devolve security responsibilities and reduce our risk exposure. The Japanese--while retaining a strong anti-militarist disposition--are willing to play a more assertive role. They are anxious for their country to behave, and to be treated as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are already highly capable, and Japanese military capabilities could quickly expand if the security environment grows more threatening.

Japan is a stable and mature democracy. The pre-World War II era, when an imperial Japan attempted to secure an exclusive economic sphere for itself, is long past. The ghosts of World War II cannot be allowed to forever dictate the shape and character of U.S.-Japan relations. Americans and Japanese should welcome a transition away from a patron-client relationship, to one based on shared interests, mutual trust and understanding.