The (Ex) Washington Realist

First, Robert Blackwill--in well-timed remarks appearing in the current issue of The National Interest, anticipated the letter sent by senior members of Congress to the Indian Prime Minister when he noted what factors might complicate the emerging U.S.-India relationship:

"The first is any problem arising out of the codification of the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal in what is called the “one-two-three” agreement—this is the document that works out the technical details of how the bilateral nuclear agreement will be implemented. Without this agreement we cannot get from here to there ...

"The second is the possibility of a divergence over what to do about Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. Some members of Congress feel very strongly that india needs to see exactly eye to eye with the United States in how to deal with Iran. There are no differences between Washington and New Delhi over the goal: neither country wants a nuclear-armed Iran. But there may emerge tactical differences regarding the best way to go about accomplishing this."

Blackwill feels that, in the end, given that so many in both Washington and New Dehli are invested in the success of the new relationship, these bumps in the road can be overcome. I hope so. But the Congressional letter worries me.

The first is that it may be used to confirm the suspicions of many in India that the United States is really not interested in relations with India because it views India as an important country, but rather that the nuclear deal is instrumental--meant to get New Dehli to sign up with U.S. priorities vis-a-vis Iran (and then China), that India is of value to the U.S. only in terms of what it can do to pressure Tehran and help contain Beijing.

The second is the assumption that India has to see Iran through the same lenses. And here the letter falls into the trap of conflating all Islamist-based terrorism and Iran. It is very true that Iran will back Sunni movements--but when they challenge U.S. and Israeli interests (e.g. Palestinian Islamic Jihad). But Iran has no use for Sunni movements in other parts of the world particularly if they attack Shi'ites. So it is true India has been subjected to terrorist attack but the groups that have carried out such actions are not ones supported by Iran (and in fact often target Shi'ites in Pakistan as well). Iran doesn't support separatism in Kashmir for the same reason it doesn't support it in Chechnya--it doesn't like Sunni radicals and it doesn't like separatism given Iran's own vulnerabilities in this regard. Also Iran likes India for its role in safeguarding one of the largest Shi'ite populations in the world.

Third, I think we have the order wrong. India needs energy. It's not going to forego relations with Iran unless it has guarantees elsewhere. Get the nuclear deal ratified and open up the possibility of a maximum expansion of India's civilian nuclear capacity, and I think we'll see greater willingness to cut Iran off. But we are falling the same trap as we did with the Russians and Iran in the 1990s--vague promises of future contracts versus real tangible deals. It's not surprising Russia went with Iran in the 1990s (and, now that Russia has real alternatives, is willing to cut Tehran off); why should we expect India to be different?

Given the reaction today in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian parliament, where there was broad agreement across party lines that India would not accept any outside interference in its foreign policy matters nor compromise with its sovereignty and national integrity, I see the possibility of the deal being scuttled, unless cooler heads on both sides prevail.