The (Ex) Washington Realist

It seems that some political circles in the United States are sorely disappointed that the British sailors and marines were released from captivity in Iran and returned home safely. For the second time, it seems, London has let us down by failing to provide the incident that could justify a military strike on Iran without needed to turn to Congress or the recalcitrant UN Security Council (the first was the fact that the British naval vessels held their fire as the sailors were apprehended by the Revolutionary Guard). Prolonged captivity (or perhaps even a few flag-draped coffins) would have done nicely.

Perhaps the Iranians released their captives for the propaganda war in the Middle East. Iranian consular officials have yet to meet with the five detained Iranian citizens taken back in January (the Red Cross has now only had their first visit). Yes, it seems that documents were being destroyed when the five were taken into custody sans passports—but they continue to be held even though our Iraqi ally said the Iranians were in fact diplomats (no matter what other activities they may have been conducting) and should be released. We have the still very murky and mysterious case of another Iranian diplomat who was seized on the streets of Baghdad by unidentified gunmen (who were wearing Iraqi uniforms) two months ago and who was set free as the British personnel were themselves being released. But now the pressure will grow on Washington to “do something” about the “Irbil Five”--especially since Iran's seizure and then release of the British was done with no official linkage between the two cases.

I always thought that the real audience for the unfolding drama of the Brits in captivity was not London or even Washington but the rest of the region—that it demonstrated Iran’s ability to shape the agenda and to show the vulnerabilities of the Western presence. Calling attention to perceived double standards never hurts either—see, we didn’t let the British languish!

The more the crisis in the region is perceived as "Tehran versus the U.S." and not "a defiant rogue spitting in the face of the global community" the U.S. loses. And Iran is well aware that to the extent the neighbors don’t sign on to offensive action against Tehran, the weaker the U.S. platform from which to launch strikes. Iran’s successes at the recent Arab summit help. Also, the appearance of reasonableness—“we are always ready to talk”—helps. Defusing a potential causus belli was critical. Ignoring what increasingly is going to be viewed as provocative behavior from the other side (U.S. attempts to seize Iranians in Iraq, even those who have the cloak of official business around them) makes you seem to be "going the extra mile" for peace. And being able to point to gestures you’ve made and how the other side hasn’t reciprocated also wins points.

And suspicion is growing, at least in some Gulf circles, that the U.S. may want to start a conflict with Iran but not be prepared to shoulder the consequences—and may be looking for an “incident.” The Russian-originated story about the so-called “Operation Bite” is continuing to circulate. But I don’t know if the U.S. appearance of “standing tough” is having the expected effect among our allies of convincing them of our resolve to act.

The high point for the U.S. was the recent Security Council decision. It's going downhill from there.