Wednesday, September 27, 2006
Thoughts on the NIE--Nothing New
Cross posted from National Interest online.
Pundits are treating the partial disclosure of the National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism as if it contains surprising new and unexpected revelations.
In December 2005, my colleague Alexis Debat, speaking at a forum organized by The National Interest, made the following set of observations about the situation in Iraq:
“You have created a base, a new base for Al-Qaeda where -- and in many ways a much more dangerous base for al Qaeda because the kind of skills that operatives -- and there are not many, but you don't need many operatives to conduct a terrorist operation. Those operatives acquire skills that are far deadlier, far more complex than the skills that they acquired in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s. I mean, if you look at the videos and you look at the training manuals -- bin Laden's training camps in the '90s were kind of a joke. I mean, they received training in small arms and tossing grenades, just small guerrilla tactics. The kind of skills that they're acquiring in Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi's organization are skills of urban terrorism -- multiple car bombs, very complex counterintelligence operations, very complex construction of clandestine networks. This is far deadlier than anything that we could have -- that we had to deal with in the past. And we have seen hundreds of volunteers go to Iraq; the problem is that we are seeing a lot of them coming back from Iraq. …
“So very clearly, the ambition goes beyond Iraq. The ambition is to create a second Al-Qaeda. At the heart of the name Al-Qaeda is “the base”—the concept of volunteers being drawn to this base, being trained, forging the bonds between themselves of combat and then going back to their countries with those bonds intact and forming the core of multinational, international, global terrorist networks.”
This was the type of conversation we were having “in the open”—and apparently was occurring behind closed doors, leading up to the National Intelligence Estimate.
One cannot help but go back to the points that former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft made in his oft-reviled Wall Street Journal op-ed back in August 2002!
Remember this?
“Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.”
And these warnings, that a focus on Iraq without a “comprehensive perspective” could lead to an “explosion of outrage against us” in the Arab and Muslim world. The result? “At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists.”
The NIE is yet another wake-up call that we cannot have a faith-based foreign policy that says the world must conform to the tenets of the believer. At the same time, we need a real conversation and debate about what to do next. We are in Iraq now; we cannot turn the clock back to 2002. The spat between Bill Clinton and Chris Wallace on Sunday was great political theater; now the accusations are flying thick and furious. But criticisms—even correct ones—do not a coherent policy make.
So what now? Paul Saunders gave his advice at the December 2005 meeting, which now, even more, would seem to point the way forward:
“Operationally, we urged the administration to focus much less on the vagaries of Iraqi politics and really to zero in on fighting the international terrorists in Iraq”—rather than lumping together into one broad category the rejectionists, the Saddam loyalists, the Sunni militias, and the Al-Qaeda presence.
“Only the international terrorists are really a threat to the United States outside of Iraq. … But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.”
It’s time to set real priorities, define our national security needs, commit the resources necessary, and to end Iraq as a social science laboratory for democratization and regional transformation.
Pundits are treating the partial disclosure of the National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism as if it contains surprising new and unexpected revelations.
In December 2005, my colleague Alexis Debat, speaking at a forum organized by The National Interest, made the following set of observations about the situation in Iraq:
“You have created a base, a new base for Al-Qaeda where -- and in many ways a much more dangerous base for al Qaeda because the kind of skills that operatives -- and there are not many, but you don't need many operatives to conduct a terrorist operation. Those operatives acquire skills that are far deadlier, far more complex than the skills that they acquired in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s. I mean, if you look at the videos and you look at the training manuals -- bin Laden's training camps in the '90s were kind of a joke. I mean, they received training in small arms and tossing grenades, just small guerrilla tactics. The kind of skills that they're acquiring in Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi's organization are skills of urban terrorism -- multiple car bombs, very complex counterintelligence operations, very complex construction of clandestine networks. This is far deadlier than anything that we could have -- that we had to deal with in the past. And we have seen hundreds of volunteers go to Iraq; the problem is that we are seeing a lot of them coming back from Iraq. …
“So very clearly, the ambition goes beyond Iraq. The ambition is to create a second Al-Qaeda. At the heart of the name Al-Qaeda is “the base”—the concept of volunteers being drawn to this base, being trained, forging the bonds between themselves of combat and then going back to their countries with those bonds intact and forming the core of multinational, international, global terrorist networks.”
This was the type of conversation we were having “in the open”—and apparently was occurring behind closed doors, leading up to the National Intelligence Estimate.
One cannot help but go back to the points that former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft made in his oft-reviled Wall Street Journal op-ed back in August 2002!
Remember this?
“Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.”
And these warnings, that a focus on Iraq without a “comprehensive perspective” could lead to an “explosion of outrage against us” in the Arab and Muslim world. The result? “At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists.”
The NIE is yet another wake-up call that we cannot have a faith-based foreign policy that says the world must conform to the tenets of the believer. At the same time, we need a real conversation and debate about what to do next. We are in Iraq now; we cannot turn the clock back to 2002. The spat between Bill Clinton and Chris Wallace on Sunday was great political theater; now the accusations are flying thick and furious. But criticisms—even correct ones—do not a coherent policy make.
So what now? Paul Saunders gave his advice at the December 2005 meeting, which now, even more, would seem to point the way forward:
“Operationally, we urged the administration to focus much less on the vagaries of Iraqi politics and really to zero in on fighting the international terrorists in Iraq”—rather than lumping together into one broad category the rejectionists, the Saddam loyalists, the Sunni militias, and the Al-Qaeda presence.
“Only the international terrorists are really a threat to the United States outside of Iraq. … But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.”
It’s time to set real priorities, define our national security needs, commit the resources necessary, and to end Iraq as a social science laboratory for democratization and regional transformation.
Comments:
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The whole point of strategy is not to rush off to attack the enemy all at once, but to calculate where you can have the most effect. This is why in World War II the US let the Nazis continue to occupy Western Europe for two years, concentrating first on NOrth Africa, then on Italy, building up to D-Day, despite all those who howled that FDR wasn't getting the job done.
# posted by 
: 1:08 PM
: 1:08 PM
“Operationally, we urged the administration to focus much less on the vagaries of Iraqi politics and really to zero in on fighting the international terrorists in Iraq”—rather than lumping together into one broad category the rejectionists, the Saddam loyalists, the Sunni militias, and the Al-Qaeda presence.
“Only the international terrorists are really a threat to the United States outside of Iraq. … But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.”
At this late stage, that is not longer a viable option. According to Colonel Devlin's report, al Qaeda in Iraq has successfully integrated into the fabric of all but a few towns in al Anbar. Now, we face a counterinsurgency against this off-shoot of AQ. The plan is to use a Shiite dominated Army to fight this war, but we will likely provoke a broad conflict throughout the region with this tactic, if we can even count on the Shiite to reclaim territory that is 1.) Sunni and 2.) devoid of oil.
The Sunni population in al Anbar, according to Michael Ware's reporting in TIME in May, views al Qaeda as "legitimate local resistance"
“Only the international terrorists are really a threat to the United States outside of Iraq. … But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.”
At this late stage, that is not longer a viable option. According to Colonel Devlin's report, al Qaeda in Iraq has successfully integrated into the fabric of all but a few towns in al Anbar. Now, we face a counterinsurgency against this off-shoot of AQ. The plan is to use a Shiite dominated Army to fight this war, but we will likely provoke a broad conflict throughout the region with this tactic, if we can even count on the Shiite to reclaim territory that is 1.) Sunni and 2.) devoid of oil.
The Sunni population in al Anbar, according to Michael Ware's reporting in TIME in May, views al Qaeda as "legitimate local resistance"
anonymous:
Yes, eminently quotable though he appears to be in certain circles, nobody ever brings up Churchill's admission that the Soviet army "tore out the guts" of the Wehrmacht...
Conservative "realist" could be indulging in some form of armchair generalship. Or he could be practising a kind of ruthless exploitation of WW II imagery that is par for the course these days and that goes far beyond the use of florid rhetoric.
He is implicitly comparing Mr. Gvosdev and others with those who "howled" that Roosevelt did not know what he was doing. Perhaps too maliciously, that might be construed to imply that Mr. Gvosdev suffers from the "feminine" flaws of not "thinking big picture" (i.e. boldly and logically) and... well, having a certain propensity to go into hysterics.
That would be only one step away from the Karl-Rove-style cut-and-run slanders that prove so effective with the Republican base and so-called "low information" swing voters.
And it would conveniently ignore that the point is that to all appearances the Iraq war is not just "not getting the job done", but actually making the job vastly more difficult.
Mr. Gvosdev: you surely realize that moderation is a lesser virtue than critical thinking. Reality can be oblivious to where the conventional extremes of the political spectrum lie.
These times call for a modicum of shrillness.
Yes, eminently quotable though he appears to be in certain circles, nobody ever brings up Churchill's admission that the Soviet army "tore out the guts" of the Wehrmacht...
Conservative "realist" could be indulging in some form of armchair generalship. Or he could be practising a kind of ruthless exploitation of WW II imagery that is par for the course these days and that goes far beyond the use of florid rhetoric.
He is implicitly comparing Mr. Gvosdev and others with those who "howled" that Roosevelt did not know what he was doing. Perhaps too maliciously, that might be construed to imply that Mr. Gvosdev suffers from the "feminine" flaws of not "thinking big picture" (i.e. boldly and logically) and... well, having a certain propensity to go into hysterics.
That would be only one step away from the Karl-Rove-style cut-and-run slanders that prove so effective with the Republican base and so-called "low information" swing voters.
And it would conveniently ignore that the point is that to all appearances the Iraq war is not just "not getting the job done", but actually making the job vastly more difficult.
Mr. Gvosdev: you surely realize that moderation is a lesser virtue than critical thinking. Reality can be oblivious to where the conventional extremes of the political spectrum lie.
These times call for a modicum of shrillness.
# posted by : 3:30 PM
: 3:30 PM
I was struck by the mention of Zarqawi as if he was still alive. These estimates take a long time to produce but if an error like that can remain in the executive summary this close to the estimate's release says much about a bureaucratic process that still needs to be fixed.
David, this summary was issued in April. It would be more alarming if they altered it at this point.
Another point:
But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.
"Those people" will not work with the Iraqi government. Even the Sufis have cast their lot with the Salafist insurgency (Jamestown Foundation).
Another point:
But that is something that can be addressed, in my view, through much a smaller military presence. And it may actually be more productive in the long run because a smaller presence would be less of a target for the rejectionists and the Saddamists. It would be less of a provocation. It would make it easier for the Iraqi government to reach out to those people if the United States had a smaller footprint.
"Those people" will not work with the Iraqi government. Even the Sufis have cast their lot with the Salafist insurgency (Jamestown Foundation).
Copy Editor,
Thank you for the correction.
I am inclined to agree that it is too late to parse our enemies in Iraq. If the present government there insists on protecting its militias/death squads, then it is hard to see why we should lose any more US lives and money to defend them.
Thank you for the correction.
I am inclined to agree that it is too late to parse our enemies in Iraq. If the present government there insists on protecting its militias/death squads, then it is hard to see why we should lose any more US lives and money to defend them.
______If the present government there insists on protecting its militias/death squads, then it is hard to see why we should lose any more US lives and money to defend them.
Focusing on the south of the country only, one can see that the four main Shi'a political parties (SCIRI, Muqtada al-Sadr's faction, Da'wa and Fadhila) are struggling for control of local and municipal governments, influence over the patchwork of decaying tribal loyalties, and a cut in the oil smuggling business.
The United States is trying to curb Iran's influence (which would become strongest if the SCIRI were to assert its preponderance) and prevent the consolidation of an environment entirely inimical to American investment (more likely under al-Sadr, who even after his uncontrollable militias became one of the main perpetrators of sectarian atrocities has been agitating for a pan-Iraqi anti-occupation front).
One has to question the prospects of such attempts to maintain a fingerhold on the situation. The British have most of the boots on the ground and are growing very impatient to leave indeed.
This helps explain much of the current tension with Iran. This also shows how little incentive the Iranians would have to become inordinately reckless, even if they came into possession of nuclear weapons. They have a miniature war to wage and win by proxy in southern Iraq, after all.
Focusing on the south of the country only, one can see that the four main Shi'a political parties (SCIRI, Muqtada al-Sadr's faction, Da'wa and Fadhila) are struggling for control of local and municipal governments, influence over the patchwork of decaying tribal loyalties, and a cut in the oil smuggling business.
The United States is trying to curb Iran's influence (which would become strongest if the SCIRI were to assert its preponderance) and prevent the consolidation of an environment entirely inimical to American investment (more likely under al-Sadr, who even after his uncontrollable militias became one of the main perpetrators of sectarian atrocities has been agitating for a pan-Iraqi anti-occupation front).
One has to question the prospects of such attempts to maintain a fingerhold on the situation. The British have most of the boots on the ground and are growing very impatient to leave indeed.
This helps explain much of the current tension with Iran. This also shows how little incentive the Iranians would have to become inordinately reckless, even if they came into possession of nuclear weapons. They have a miniature war to wage and win by proxy in southern Iraq, after all.
# posted by : 1:46 AM
: 1:46 AM
The recent surveys released by the State Department, as well as the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, go a long way towards discrediting the assertions made by copy editor. Within these surveys, you'll find that Al-Queda in Iraq is very unpopular to the Iraqi people - the same Iraqi people who support attacks on US troops by a large majority.
I wholeheartedly agree with Paul Saunders. I've been pushing this view (sort of pointlessly) on opinion blogs for at least a year.
Even the white house sees the value of trying to split Al-Queda in Iraq off from the Sunni insurgency. The problem is the schizophrenia of their approach: they are trying to tempt the Sunni insurgency into fighting Al-Queida ***while refusing to stop fighting the Sunni Insurgency.*** It's an incoherent policy, and that's why it is failing. The Admin's political red lines prevent it from making neccesary corrections to refocus the war on, as Paul and Nick say, the international, religious fundamentalist terrorists in Iraq - still an unpopular minority, after all this time.
Jordan W. '02
I wholeheartedly agree with Paul Saunders. I've been pushing this view (sort of pointlessly) on opinion blogs for at least a year.
Even the white house sees the value of trying to split Al-Queda in Iraq off from the Sunni insurgency. The problem is the schizophrenia of their approach: they are trying to tempt the Sunni insurgency into fighting Al-Queida ***while refusing to stop fighting the Sunni Insurgency.*** It's an incoherent policy, and that's why it is failing. The Admin's political red lines prevent it from making neccesary corrections to refocus the war on, as Paul and Nick say, the international, religious fundamentalist terrorists in Iraq - still an unpopular minority, after all this time.
Jordan W. '02
# posted by : 11:15 AM
: 11:15 AM
Jordan W.
Yes, US policies in the Persian Gulf and Levant seem to be rather incoherent.
I have heard, for example, that there were several days of celeberations in many (but not all) UAE cities after 9/11. That college students came to their class rooms jubilant.
And now US is proposing to protect UAE against Iran; the only country whose population did not join in, some of whose citizens held a candle light vigil for the 9/11 victims.
There is also this: the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is supported by the Sunni populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, and Jordan: all nominally friendly governments to the United States.
Consider also the Turkish movie "Valley of the Wolves": Americans and Jews are kidnapping Iraq's children for their organs. It has been a very popular movie in Turkey.
And all this, is just the tip of the ice-berg of incoherence; theaten every government (friend, foe, or neutral) where the friendly governments' populations are your enemies and the self-selected opposing governments' populations are either friendly or neutral.
Yes, US policies in the Persian Gulf and Levant seem to be rather incoherent.
I have heard, for example, that there were several days of celeberations in many (but not all) UAE cities after 9/11. That college students came to their class rooms jubilant.
And now US is proposing to protect UAE against Iran; the only country whose population did not join in, some of whose citizens held a candle light vigil for the 9/11 victims.
There is also this: the Sunni insurgency in Iraq is supported by the Sunni populations of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, and Jordan: all nominally friendly governments to the United States.
Consider also the Turkish movie "Valley of the Wolves": Americans and Jews are kidnapping Iraq's children for their organs. It has been a very popular movie in Turkey.
And all this, is just the tip of the ice-berg of incoherence; theaten every government (friend, foe, or neutral) where the friendly governments' populations are your enemies and the self-selected opposing governments' populations are either friendly or neutral.
# posted by : 7:47 AM
: 7:47 AM
David, fine point and well expressed:
If the present government there insists on protecting its militias/death squads, then it is hard to see why we should lose any more US lives and money to defend them.
Certainly the current force level isn't going to stop militias with the tacit approval (or acceptance, or resigned acceptance) of a weak government.
If the present government there insists on protecting its militias/death squads, then it is hard to see why we should lose any more US lives and money to defend them.
Certainly the current force level isn't going to stop militias with the tacit approval (or acceptance, or resigned acceptance) of a weak government.
Also, in the mean time we are seeing a Sunni insurgency get "amped up" and radicalized.
That is the reason I thought the Lebanon campaign was so stupid: wars radicalize populations.
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That is the reason I thought the Lebanon campaign was so stupid: wars radicalize populations.
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