The (Ex) Washington Realist

"I left the evening, puzzled as I have been for the last several months, about why the formation of a broad-based, bipartisan realist-centered consensus still seems elusive. Certainly there seems to be a strong New York constituency, particularly within the business and financial communities, for a rational foreign policy that cherishes American values but focuses first and foremost on achieving results."

The proximate reason why there isn't a broader consensus for results may be the extent to which primaries have come to dominate American elections. Primaries tend to encourage polarization rather than consensus.

But a deeper reason, I think, is that public policy tends to concern itself in normal times with those things that are either unchanging or recurring in public life. It is less able to handle those things that are recognizably unique one-time events. Unique events, the moments that define an era, engage people in responses that imply common effort toward an achievable goal in finite time that in some sense brings irreversible change. The Depression and World War II were both events in this sense. We achieved bipartisan unity during the war and in the years that followed because we recovered in finite time and thought we could prevent both disasters from happening again.

The consensus broke down in the 1960s and has never been fully restored. President Bush has tried to frame the war on terror as a defining moment in the spirit of World War II. But he has run aground because (1) he has defined the struggle in such a way that the limitation on our means and the distance and uncertainty of its end have undermined public support, and more damagingly, (2) he has endorsed the idea of our enemies, that we live in a dualistic world, when what he or his successor need instead to do is to offer the world as a whole a singular transformative event that affirms the unity of the planet under some form of shared sacrifice.
 

"Realism" is a dirty word because it has Kissingerian overtones; you say you are a "realist" and people say, oh, you were out killing babies in Cambodia and hooking people up to electroshock tables in Chile. It's a hard rap to beat.

Why did Antol Lieven and John Hulsman call their book "ethical" realism--it implies that there is an "unethical" realism whihc is what most people think realism is.
 

Nick, I just got the e-mail announcement that Rand Beers is launching his National Security Network. Is realism mentioned at all? No. The buzz words are "pragmatic and principled foreign policy."
 

I'll start by stating the obvious (or, if you will, I'll state the obvious throughout the post).

Using the adjective "realist" as a label to indicate a political "denomination", bi-partisan or not, is fraught with dangers. Almost everybody regards him or herself as a realist, even those who proclaim their "idealism" or their "optimism" (terms that have arguably become even more debased). A "realist" is therefore somebody who implicitly proclaims that he or she is better at realism than others. This is no small claim.

Now, Mr. Gvosdev is patently better at interpreting geopolitical trends than the gaggle of ideologues and opportunistic middlebrow "moderates" that dominate the beltway and the dismal world of contemporary punditry. To avoid being damned with faint praise, however, one should always be careful. When I read, say, the utterly inept "Brussels unbound" piece drafted by one of his collaborators, "realism" was not the concept that sprung to mind.

Let's rediscover the virtues of topicality, however. Mr. Soros is an activist in a polarized environment. One can expect rhetoric excesses on his part, and it is not surprising that in his zeal to take the Bush administration to task he ends up suggesting some alternatives that sound trite. And perhaps he does indeed underestimate the threat posed by terrorists. On the other hand, I think it is necessary to have voices that challenge the notion of a "war on terror" vigorously.

The notion is, to be perfectly honest, quite insane. It emerged as part of some sort of post-9/11 "political correctness", one certainly not managed and exploited by the wraith-like "pc-brigades" that are a perennial bugaboo of the American right.

One does not wage war on cold weather, or disease. That is no proper way to acknowledge their seriousness. One protects oneself from them. One strives to minimize their impact. And one certainly does not use them as pretexts to engage in venal and incompetent adventures allegedly meant to tackle their "root causes".

The thought that a group of lunatics ranting from caves could bring modern societies to their knees were those societies to lose the "war" is ludicrous (and the associated imagery is farcical). These lunatics can however wreak considerable havoc. To thwart their schemes, one has to fight their networks with networks, first and foremost. Transnational networks of police and information services. Robust emergency infrastructures. Obviously, military force has to be brought to bear in circumstances like the failed attempt to corner Bin Laden, in 2002. But what exactly did the recent work of the British police and other agencies to stop the airplane bombings have to do with a war?

The use of the term "war" automatically enshrines the armed forces as the chief tool to tackle the threat posed by terrorism. This smacks of an attempt to "reinvent" i.e. perpetuate their Cold-war role. A role that runs counter to the original American tradition of distrust of a large standing army, and that was designed by men who'd lived through the Great Depression and were willing to create Keynesian "insurances" against similar occurrences.
 

But Americans love wars (go back to the Patton speech that opens the movie). War on drugs, war on poverty, war on crime. Energy security is the "moral equivalent of war." Inflation was only to be whipped, rather than warred upon.

But I have to say I love the clip from the Borat movie with him at the rodeo saying that kazakhstan supports your "war of terror."
 

BTW, "realist" is a noun, not an adjective. Silly me.
 

__But Americans love wars (go back to the Patton speech that opens the movie). War on drugs, war on poverty, war on crime...

Americans are perfectly capable of distinguishing figures of speech from literal programmes of action. The fearmongering (which is not limited to the States) uses an array of techniques.
 

The debate over terrorism seems to rest on whether al-Qaida and cognate groups are a manageable threat, by which is meant manageable through better police and intelligence work rather than war.

But this is not the question we need to confront. The real question is again whether the costs of miscalculating threats (either by overestimating them or by underestimating them) are rising or are staying the same.

If the costs of US policy mistakes are not rising, then terrorism will be manageable because we will be able to recover from our future failures in dealing with it. But if the costs of miscalculation are rising over time, then we need to think more deeply about the world order.
 

____The debate over terrorism seems to rest on whether al-Qaida and cognate groups are a manageable threat, by which is meant manageable through better police and intelligence work rather than war.

The term "debate" is a bit on the charitable side, in view of the trashiness and outrageousness of the rhetoric emanating from such quarters as... well, the White House.
War is not a particularly good means to tackle terrorism, even when the scale of the damage wrought by terrorists makes police work appear insufficient or even inconsequential in the eyes of the public. If committed by state actors, the devastation associated with large-scale terrorism would undoubtedly provide a just "casus belli". But terrorist networks are distinctly more elusive than state actors.
"Proportionality between the ends and the means used" and "having a reasonable chance of success" are generally regarded as additional conditions of "jus ad bellum". In the current Middle Eastern context, Western warfare (which at its core remains a zapped-up version of the good ol' principles of strategic and tactical bombing) achieves neither.
Military force in modern counterterrorism should be a sparsely-used complement of the main activities of intelligence gathering, policing and maintaining high-levels of emergency readiness. That's hardly rocket science.
____But this is not the question we need to confront. The real question is again whether the costs of miscalculating threats (either by overestimating them or by underestimating them) are rising or are staying the same.
This I think is a question that can only be answered empirically. And this administration has initiated a number of fascinating experiments.
"Creative chaos" was a theory bandied by ideologues close to the administration, especially during its first term. The reality on the ground in Iraq is creative indeed.
The "cordon sanitaire" which the US have been trying to erect around Iran is crumbling in plain sight of America's main contenders for global influence. The creative forces taking root in Afghanistan make it no longer viable as an alternative to circumvent Iran in order to funnel oil and gas to India; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in which Iran enjoys observer status since 2005) has managed to place America's long-term military presence in Central Asia on a most shaky foundation; and, obviously and most importantly, Iran is the winner of the Iraq war (even more so than the Kurds, who still have to secure Kirkuk and potentially get Turkey off their backs).
Maybe future historians will conclude that America's standing was not seriously eroded by any of the above. I wouldn't bet on it.
_____If the costs of US policy mistakes are not rising, then terrorism will be manageable because we will be able to recover from our future failures in dealing with it. But if the costs of miscalculation are rising over time, then...
It depends on what you understand by "recover". America's predominance is clearly declining. It will be increasingly forced to rediscover prudence as the chief virtue of good statesmanship. Nevertheless, there is indeed life after hegemony, and America will, in the long run, remain a prosperous and open society.
The notion of "decadence" which features so heavily in E. Gibbon's "History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" does not seem to apply to our so-called "post-industrial" age. It's also quite discredited among many serious historians and political scientists who regard it as vague and generally useless. And yet it remains a central feature of popular perceptions of what occurs with the varying fortunes of states (which is in turn exploited by not-so-serious historians and political scientists, like "professor imperialist" Niall Ferguson or "Thucydides Gump" Victor Davis Hanson).
So yeah, the assets within Interstate 495 are becoming less hot by the decade, and its denizens will increasingly have to watch their step in the international arena. But the benefits accruing from the increased wealth of the new global players should far outweigh the loss of clout of the West, in principle.
_____we need to think more deeply about the world order.

The dilettantism of this administration is rightly deemed to have increased world disorder. This is effectively poison to America's status, and is to be ignored by who-cares-what-the-world-thinks-about-us chest-thumpers at their own peril. And that of more sensible Americans.
 

Sorry for the double post. The formatting of the first one was lousy.

____The debate over terrorism seems to rest on whether al-Qaida and cognate groups are a manageable threat, by which is meant manageable through better police and intelligence work rather than war.


The term "debate" is a bit on the charitable side, in view of the trashiness and outrageousness of the rhetoric emanating from such quarters as... well, the White House.


War is not a particularly good means to tackle terrorism, even when the scale of the damage wrought by terrorists makes police work appear insufficient or even inconsequential in the eyes of the public. If committed by state actors, the devastation associated with large-scale terrorism would undoubtedly provide a just "casus belli". But terrorist networks are distinctly more elusive than state actors.


"Proportionality between the ends and the means used" and "having a reasonable chance of success" are generally regarded as additional conditions of "jus ad bellum". In the current Middle Eastern context, Western warfare (which at its core remains a zapped-up version of the good ol' principles of strategic and tactical bombing) achieves neither.


Military force in modern counterterrorism should be a sparsely-used complement of the main activities of intelligence gathering, policing and maintaining high-levels of emergency readiness. That's hardly rocket science.


____But this is not the question we need to confront. The real question is again whether the costs of miscalculating threats (either by overestimating them or by underestimating them) are rising or are staying the same.


This I think is a question that can only be answered empirically. And this administration has initiated a number of fascinating experiments.



"Creative chaos" was a theory bandied by ideologues close to the administration, especially during its first term. The reality on the ground in Iraq is creative indeed.


The "cordon sanitaire" which the US have been trying to erect around Iran is crumbling in plain sight of America's main contenders for global influence. The creative forces taking root in Afghanistan make it no longer viable as an alternative to circumvent Iran in order to funnel oil and gas to India; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in which Iran enjoys observer status since 2005) has managed to place America's long-term military presence in Central Asia on a most shaky foundation; and, obviously and most importantly, Iran is the winner of the Iraq war (even more so than the Kurds, who still have to secure Kirkuk and potentially get Turkey off their backs).


Maybe future historians will conclude that America's standing was not seriously eroded by any of the above. I wouldn't bet on it.


_____If the costs of US policy mistakes are not rising, then terrorism will be manageable because we will be able to recover from our future failures in dealing with it. But if the costs of miscalculation are rising over time, then...



It depends on what you understand by "recover". America's predominance is clearly declining. It will be increasingly forced to rediscover prudence as the chief virtue of good statesmanship. Nevertheless, there is indeed life after hegemony, and America will, in the long run, remain a prosperous and open society.



The notion of "decadence" which features so heavily in E. Gibbon's "History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" does not seem to apply to our so-called "post-industrial" age. It's also quite discredited among many serious historians and political scientists who regard it as vague and generally useless. And yet it remains a central feature of popular perceptions of what occurs with the varying fortunes of states (which is in turn exploited by not-so-serious historians and political scientists, like "professor imperialist" Niall Ferguson or "Thucydides Gump" Victor Davis Hanson).


So yeah, the assets within Interstate 495 are becoming less hot by the decade, and its denizens will increasingly have to watch their step in the international arena. But the benefits accruing from the increased wealth of the new global players should far outweigh the loss of clout of the West, in principle.


_____we need to think more deeply about the world order.



The dilettantism of this administration is rightly deemed to have increased world disorder. This is effectively poison to America's status, and is to be ignored by who-cares-what-the-world-thinks-about-us chest-thumpers at their own peril. And that of more sensible Americans.