Wednesday, August 30, 2006
America: A Crippled Superpower?
This fascinating roundtable will be rebroadcast by C-SPAN tonight at 9:38 PM EST and 1:18 AM EST Thursday morning, for those who missed it this afternoon.
Some points made during the course of the discussion:
Dimitri Simes opened by answering the question posed, the United States is not a crippled superpower, but has a crippled foreign policy leadership in both parties.
Graham Fuller, vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council during the second term of the Reagan Administration, whose "Superpower Fatigue" essay in the summer issue of TNI served as the background for our discussion, contrasted the reality of U.S. supremacy around the world with the fact that there is currently a low ebb of U.S. real power (military force plus soft power) and worried that too many policymakers are living in a "fantasy world" that does not correspond to actual conditions on the ground. He noted Americans must ask a basic question: why do we want to be powerful? The point is not to tweak policy but go back to square one and rethink the purpose of our position in the world. In particular, we need to avoid taking on what he termed are "false burdens" such as assuming that the United States must take the lead in ensuring a free flow of oil and thus take on a number of commitments.
Charles Pena of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy said we need to rethink what we mean by power; we usually conflate this with military power but military force cannot change the Middle East. Instead, we have to think about how we can contain the negative forces in the region from spilling out and define the limits of where and how we will use power.
Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group (and a TNI contributing editor) said the metaphor is not one of a crippled power (which implies loss of function) but of Gulliver tied down by Lilliputians, capable of limiting our freedom of action. We live in a world where commodities most critical to the global economy are located in undesirable areas (e.g. energy in West Africa). He also pointed out a problem in U.S. strategic thinking. We equate stability and prosperity with open societies; but a certain degree of stability can also be achieved from a closed system and there can be strong incentives for a regime to stay closed. (As I've noted in previous TWR posts, this is documented in his forthcoming work The J-Curve.) Bremmer also wanted to point to some positives over the last several years--a stronger relationship with Japan, new movement on the U.S.-India relationship, even the beginnings of a strategic dialogue with China.
Anatol Lieven, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, also a TNI contributing editor, pointed out that theoretical power is not useful if it cannot be brought to bear on a specific problem (e.g. carrier battle groups are quite powerful but useless on the streets of Fallujah). To govern, in the end, is to be prepared to choose between different alternatives, all of which may be unpleasant to some degree--but to have the ability to make rational and moral choices that safeguard your power, contrasting the successful efforts of the British Empire versus the disastrous lack of choices made by the German Empire in the immediate pre-World War I environment.
Some other points--Harlan Ullman called attention to our "broken government" as exemplified by the Katrina disaster, and the emergence of a new governing credo that says "I pontificate" therefore it is, combined with an overall lack of accountability in government--something, by the way, as a side note, I hear often in New York, that a fund manager with the track record of a government official would be fired. Larry Johnson called attention to a crippling going on in the military, a lowering of standards to keep forces up and running (since we are losing the equivalent, he said, of a battalion a month in killed and wounded). Paul Starobin wondered about an "image of impotence" if the U.S. is seen to be unable to get things done.
I reiterated points that readers of TWR are familiar with--the Napoleonic conundrum and the distinction Chris Layne is drawing between "deterrence" and "compellence".
A very stimulating and provocative discussion, and I urge you to watch it in full.
Some points made during the course of the discussion:
Dimitri Simes opened by answering the question posed, the United States is not a crippled superpower, but has a crippled foreign policy leadership in both parties.
Graham Fuller, vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council during the second term of the Reagan Administration, whose "Superpower Fatigue" essay in the summer issue of TNI served as the background for our discussion, contrasted the reality of U.S. supremacy around the world with the fact that there is currently a low ebb of U.S. real power (military force plus soft power) and worried that too many policymakers are living in a "fantasy world" that does not correspond to actual conditions on the ground. He noted Americans must ask a basic question: why do we want to be powerful? The point is not to tweak policy but go back to square one and rethink the purpose of our position in the world. In particular, we need to avoid taking on what he termed are "false burdens" such as assuming that the United States must take the lead in ensuring a free flow of oil and thus take on a number of commitments.
Charles Pena of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy said we need to rethink what we mean by power; we usually conflate this with military power but military force cannot change the Middle East. Instead, we have to think about how we can contain the negative forces in the region from spilling out and define the limits of where and how we will use power.
Ian Bremmer, President of the Eurasia Group (and a TNI contributing editor) said the metaphor is not one of a crippled power (which implies loss of function) but of Gulliver tied down by Lilliputians, capable of limiting our freedom of action. We live in a world where commodities most critical to the global economy are located in undesirable areas (e.g. energy in West Africa). He also pointed out a problem in U.S. strategic thinking. We equate stability and prosperity with open societies; but a certain degree of stability can also be achieved from a closed system and there can be strong incentives for a regime to stay closed. (As I've noted in previous TWR posts, this is documented in his forthcoming work The J-Curve.) Bremmer also wanted to point to some positives over the last several years--a stronger relationship with Japan, new movement on the U.S.-India relationship, even the beginnings of a strategic dialogue with China.
Anatol Lieven, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, also a TNI contributing editor, pointed out that theoretical power is not useful if it cannot be brought to bear on a specific problem (e.g. carrier battle groups are quite powerful but useless on the streets of Fallujah). To govern, in the end, is to be prepared to choose between different alternatives, all of which may be unpleasant to some degree--but to have the ability to make rational and moral choices that safeguard your power, contrasting the successful efforts of the British Empire versus the disastrous lack of choices made by the German Empire in the immediate pre-World War I environment.
Some other points--Harlan Ullman called attention to our "broken government" as exemplified by the Katrina disaster, and the emergence of a new governing credo that says "I pontificate" therefore it is, combined with an overall lack of accountability in government--something, by the way, as a side note, I hear often in New York, that a fund manager with the track record of a government official would be fired. Larry Johnson called attention to a crippling going on in the military, a lowering of standards to keep forces up and running (since we are losing the equivalent, he said, of a battalion a month in killed and wounded). Paul Starobin wondered about an "image of impotence" if the U.S. is seen to be unable to get things done.
I reiterated points that readers of TWR are familiar with--the Napoleonic conundrum and the distinction Chris Layne is drawing between "deterrence" and "compellence".
A very stimulating and provocative discussion, and I urge you to watch it in full.
Comments:
<< Home
Nikolas,
I would like to thank the participants for an interesting exchange of views. Thank you also for allowing us to be virtually at the table with all of you.
I was pleased to hear Anatol Lieven make an analogy that I would make myself between America and late 19th century Britain; the difference he sees between Britain in 1895 and America now is much less if he backdates the analogy with Britain to the late 1870s or early 1880s.
Graham Fuller's call for greater multipolarity seemed to obtain general assent for the reasons he gave and was the focal point of the discussion. This point deserves further exploration since, as several participants noted, a less unipolar world is in fact coming whether we want it or not.
Two problems I see are:
1. If terrorists strike America again but more catastrophically, the United States could infringe the sovereignty of another state in response, or demand changes in the international system as a whole that would require self-imposed limits by everyone. I wonder if the other great powers would agree.
Right now, the rest of the world tends to resist the United States because it is so powerful and so willing to impose itself unilaterally. But if a less powerful America agrees to submit to a more stringent international regime to which it asks the accession of everyone else, would the world be more inclined to comply?
Second, a number of tensions have nothing to do with the United States: China vs. Japan, China vs. India, Pakistan vs. India, Russia vs. China, and Iran vs. the Sunni Arabs. A relatively less powerful America might actually have more freedom of action in a more strongly multipolar world, but a larger question is whether such a world as a whole would be more stable or less so. Can a world with no hegemon keep its tensions under control?
But these are questions for a future roundtable. I was very encouraged to hear such serious consideration of a less unipolar world that in the conditions of just a few years ago would have seemed far less possible. I hope this discussion continues.
I would like to thank the participants for an interesting exchange of views. Thank you also for allowing us to be virtually at the table with all of you.
I was pleased to hear Anatol Lieven make an analogy that I would make myself between America and late 19th century Britain; the difference he sees between Britain in 1895 and America now is much less if he backdates the analogy with Britain to the late 1870s or early 1880s.
Graham Fuller's call for greater multipolarity seemed to obtain general assent for the reasons he gave and was the focal point of the discussion. This point deserves further exploration since, as several participants noted, a less unipolar world is in fact coming whether we want it or not.
Two problems I see are:
1. If terrorists strike America again but more catastrophically, the United States could infringe the sovereignty of another state in response, or demand changes in the international system as a whole that would require self-imposed limits by everyone. I wonder if the other great powers would agree.
Right now, the rest of the world tends to resist the United States because it is so powerful and so willing to impose itself unilaterally. But if a less powerful America agrees to submit to a more stringent international regime to which it asks the accession of everyone else, would the world be more inclined to comply?
Second, a number of tensions have nothing to do with the United States: China vs. Japan, China vs. India, Pakistan vs. India, Russia vs. China, and Iran vs. the Sunni Arabs. A relatively less powerful America might actually have more freedom of action in a more strongly multipolar world, but a larger question is whether such a world as a whole would be more stable or less so. Can a world with no hegemon keep its tensions under control?
But these are questions for a future roundtable. I was very encouraged to hear such serious consideration of a less unipolar world that in the conditions of just a few years ago would have seemed far less possible. I hope this discussion continues.
Thank you for this roundtable, which I chanced upon, on CSPAN. The one main frustration for me is that only a few of the speakers were identified, and some of us are not familiar with the faces in Washington to know who's who.
Will a transcript be available?
Will a transcript be available?
# posted by 
: 12:43 AM
: 12:43 AM
Nick: Since I don't get C-Span in my basic, no-frills cable package (this may have something to do with my lTV set's location in Japan), I'll limit my comment to the following:
The three positives Ian points out are with Japan, China and India; all major industral centers (in Asia) with huge energy deficits. (Japan is not growing by much, and India is not quite there yet, but we're talking about policy decisions for the coming decades.) The oil and gas exporters have benefited from a shifting supply curve. Are we seeing the seeds of a coalition that will move the other one?
If so, all the more reason for Japan and China to get their acts together. Yasukuni seems to be a done deal. Now the tough one: the East China Sea.
The three positives Ian points out are with Japan, China and India; all major industral centers (in Asia) with huge energy deficits. (Japan is not growing by much, and India is not quite there yet, but we're talking about policy decisions for the coming decades.) The oil and gas exporters have benefited from a shifting supply curve. Are we seeing the seeds of a coalition that will move the other one?
If so, all the more reason for Japan and China to get their acts together. Yasukuni seems to be a done deal. Now the tough one: the East China Sea.
Thank you for a very "provocative" - to use the term so well employed in the roundtable discussion - presentation of a number of facets of the present situation. A couple of points:
Graham Fuller's assertion that one simply must go outside the mainstream US media to be at all informed, in conjunction with another panelist's reminder that America is the American people, points to a tentative conclusion that we will have a rational foreign policy when the populace demands it. This also brings to mind Anatol Lieven's "great faith in the ability of a majority of the American people to return to rational and enlightened self-interest."
This does not inspire hope. Two well aged quotes may serve to illustrate different aspects of the conundrum. The first, regarding the American public: “You know the really great thing about television? If something important happens, anywhere in the world, night or day, you can always change the channel” from the character Rev. Jim Ignatowski of TV sitcom "Taxi."
The second, regarding the press: "Objective journalism is one of the main reasons American politics has been allowed to be so corrupt for so long. You can't be objective about Nixon" from the late Dr. Hunter S. Thompson. Obviously we can substitute Dubya for Nixon and the adage carries forward, but it also serves to illustrate how little things have changed in the intervening decades.
Graham Fuller's assertion that one simply must go outside the mainstream US media to be at all informed, in conjunction with another panelist's reminder that America is the American people, points to a tentative conclusion that we will have a rational foreign policy when the populace demands it. This also brings to mind Anatol Lieven's "great faith in the ability of a majority of the American people to return to rational and enlightened self-interest."
This does not inspire hope. Two well aged quotes may serve to illustrate different aspects of the conundrum. The first, regarding the American public: “You know the really great thing about television? If something important happens, anywhere in the world, night or day, you can always change the channel” from the character Rev. Jim Ignatowski of TV sitcom "Taxi."
The second, regarding the press: "Objective journalism is one of the main reasons American politics has been allowed to be so corrupt for so long. You can't be objective about Nixon" from the late Dr. Hunter S. Thompson. Obviously we can substitute Dubya for Nixon and the adage carries forward, but it also serves to illustrate how little things have changed in the intervening decades.
# posted by : 5:13 AM
: 5:13 AM
As far as I can tell, US is a negative superpower; i.e. it has an enormous power to cause harm and pain.
Further, it has a huge capacity to thwart courses of actions that it does not like (say the emergence of an Asian IMF after the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia).
US can bomb any European State with impunity and not just third-world countries. But at the end of hthe day, US cannot dictate the terms of peace.
US is not crippled, it is crippled to achieve positive results in the international arena.
Further, it has a huge capacity to thwart courses of actions that it does not like (say the emergence of an Asian IMF after the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia).
US can bomb any European State with impunity and not just third-world countries. But at the end of hthe day, US cannot dictate the terms of peace.
US is not crippled, it is crippled to achieve positive results in the international arena.
# posted by : 8:16 PM
: 8:16 PM
"US can bomb any European State with impunity and not just third-world countries."
No, it cannot.
It mustn't have escaped your notice that nuclear weapons were already a fully functional technology in 1945. They are kind of old hat, thus. Any industrialized state this side of Luxemburg could acquire nuclear weapons quite easily, should the desire to do so exist.
It's obvious that in spite of all the transatlantic aggravation of the last few years, there is no real hostility on anybody's part. But even as a jejune power fantasy, your statement does not work.
Which brings us to a broader, far more interesting issue: the difficulties encountered by Mr. Gvosdev and other "realists" in the States, which manifest themselves in the caginess, the daintiness with which they point out that the American hegemon is naked.
Mr. Gvosdev says that the possibility that the Iraq campaign has weakened the USA is "an interesting notion" (I'm quoting from memory). It's not merely interesting, it's plain as day. The USA are supposed to be at the head of the international world *order*. It goes against the most fundamental interests of such a country to launch military campaigns that end up sowing chaos. Chaos that it proves utterly unable to curb.
Mr. Fuller worries that too many policymakers are living in a "fantasy world". But what is the exact nature of those fantasies? Is it all about democracy and idealism? Again, punches are pulled.
Mrs. Lieven and Billington engage in analogies with late 19th century Britain; those may be more or less apt to evoke the increasingly multipolar character of the world, yet they fail to describe the nature of said multipolarity accurately, and in particular the stringent limits it imposes on the exercise of power, American or otherwise. Historical analogies are by no means useless, but they are always flawed.
Forgive the smugness, but this blog is not only interesting, it is also quite amusing.
No, it cannot.
It mustn't have escaped your notice that nuclear weapons were already a fully functional technology in 1945. They are kind of old hat, thus. Any industrialized state this side of Luxemburg could acquire nuclear weapons quite easily, should the desire to do so exist.
It's obvious that in spite of all the transatlantic aggravation of the last few years, there is no real hostility on anybody's part. But even as a jejune power fantasy, your statement does not work.
Which brings us to a broader, far more interesting issue: the difficulties encountered by Mr. Gvosdev and other "realists" in the States, which manifest themselves in the caginess, the daintiness with which they point out that the American hegemon is naked.
Mr. Gvosdev says that the possibility that the Iraq campaign has weakened the USA is "an interesting notion" (I'm quoting from memory). It's not merely interesting, it's plain as day. The USA are supposed to be at the head of the international world *order*. It goes against the most fundamental interests of such a country to launch military campaigns that end up sowing chaos. Chaos that it proves utterly unable to curb.
Mr. Fuller worries that too many policymakers are living in a "fantasy world". But what is the exact nature of those fantasies? Is it all about democracy and idealism? Again, punches are pulled.
Mrs. Lieven and Billington engage in analogies with late 19th century Britain; those may be more or less apt to evoke the increasingly multipolar character of the world, yet they fail to describe the nature of said multipolarity accurately, and in particular the stringent limits it imposes on the exercise of power, American or otherwise. Historical analogies are by no means useless, but they are always flawed.
Forgive the smugness, but this blog is not only interesting, it is also quite amusing.
# posted by : 7:53 AM
: 7:53 AM
gnôthi seautón:
Thank you for your response.
The European countries do not have the capacity to defend themselves against an aerial US assault; the type that is touted against Iran; not UK, not Germany, and not France. They just do not have the air defense and C4 assets to effectively resist US hard power. My point was the utter stupidity of relying on hard power as sole component of power.
I am aware of the nuclear and rocket technology being old hat. Yes, many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them (I imagine you are excepting France).
About 19-century and more antique analogies; I am in agreement; starts good discussions but not a great guide to policy, I am afraid.
The best way of understanding international relations to me has been to consider states as thugs and bullies; completely amoral, totally un-altruistic, eminently cunning, fundamentally insecure, alternately vacillating between passivity (when confronted by a bigger thug or a coalition of the willing thugs) or aggression (when opportunity presents itself) all the while being splendid examples of adolescent human males.
Thank you for your response.
The European countries do not have the capacity to defend themselves against an aerial US assault; the type that is touted against Iran; not UK, not Germany, and not France. They just do not have the air defense and C4 assets to effectively resist US hard power. My point was the utter stupidity of relying on hard power as sole component of power.
I am aware of the nuclear and rocket technology being old hat. Yes, many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them (I imagine you are excepting France).
About 19-century and more antique analogies; I am in agreement; starts good discussions but not a great guide to policy, I am afraid.
The best way of understanding international relations to me has been to consider states as thugs and bullies; completely amoral, totally un-altruistic, eminently cunning, fundamentally insecure, alternately vacillating between passivity (when confronted by a bigger thug or a coalition of the willing thugs) or aggression (when opportunity presents itself) all the while being splendid examples of adolescent human males.
# posted by : 8:17 AM
: 8:17 AM
It is not my intention to come across as condescending. I should have paid heed to the finer points of your original post.
However, the notion that "many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them" strikes me as somewhat flimsy. The European Space Agency (ESA) is one of the leading launchers of commercial satellites. I know several ESA engineers, actually, and they are quite capable fellows. I've never had much interest in military tech, but I doubt that delivering nuclear warheads is a fundamentally more difficult endeavour than putting stuff into orbit.
The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers.
In that vein, it is undeniable that the US has a technological edge over the rest of the world in the military domain. In view however of the impossibility of putting all that gear to use, except against foes that would have been hopelessly outclassed no matter what*, one has to wonder whether said technological edge** is rather a fig leaf with which to justify a truly Pharaonic exercise in military Keynesianism i.e. a bloated "defense" budget. A taboo topic, I guess, since America is supposed to derive its economic strength only from the magic of free markets.
*: the case of Saddam's emasculated, failed Iraq being particularly glaring.
**: the touting of which obviously goes hand-in-hand with a pervasive culture of lionization of the military.
However, the notion that "many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them" strikes me as somewhat flimsy. The European Space Agency (ESA) is one of the leading launchers of commercial satellites. I know several ESA engineers, actually, and they are quite capable fellows. I've never had much interest in military tech, but I doubt that delivering nuclear warheads is a fundamentally more difficult endeavour than putting stuff into orbit.
The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers.
In that vein, it is undeniable that the US has a technological edge over the rest of the world in the military domain. In view however of the impossibility of putting all that gear to use, except against foes that would have been hopelessly outclassed no matter what*, one has to wonder whether said technological edge** is rather a fig leaf with which to justify a truly Pharaonic exercise in military Keynesianism i.e. a bloated "defense" budget. A taboo topic, I guess, since America is supposed to derive its economic strength only from the magic of free markets.
*: the case of Saddam's emasculated, failed Iraq being particularly glaring.
**: the touting of which obviously goes hand-in-hand with a pervasive culture of lionization of the military.
# posted by : 9:00 AM
: 9:00 AM
It is not my intention to come across as condescending. I should have paid heed to the finer points of your original post.
However, the notion that "many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them" strikes me as somewhat flimsy. The European Space Agency (ESA) is one of the leading launchers of commercial satellites. I know several ESA engineers, actually, and they are quite capable fellows. I've never had much interest in military tech, but I doubt that delivering nuclear warheads is a fundamentally more difficult endeavour than putting stuff into orbit.
The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers.
In that vein, it is undeniable that the US has a technological edge over the rest of the world in the military domain. In view however of the impossibility of putting all that gear to use, except against foes that would have been hopelessly outclassed no matter what*, one has to wonder whether said technological edge** is rather a fig leaf with which to justify a truly Pharaonic exercise in military Keynesianism i.e. a bloated "defense" budget. A taboo topic, I guess, since America is supposed to derive its economic strength only from the magic of free markets.
*: the case of Saddam's emasculated, failed Iraq being particularly glaring.
**: the touting of which obviously goes hand-in-hand with a pervasive culture of lionization of the military.
However, the notion that "many EU states may be able to build nuclear weapons but they currently do not have the assets to deliver them" strikes me as somewhat flimsy. The European Space Agency (ESA) is one of the leading launchers of commercial satellites. I know several ESA engineers, actually, and they are quite capable fellows. I've never had much interest in military tech, but I doubt that delivering nuclear warheads is a fundamentally more difficult endeavour than putting stuff into orbit.
The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers.
In that vein, it is undeniable that the US has a technological edge over the rest of the world in the military domain. In view however of the impossibility of putting all that gear to use, except against foes that would have been hopelessly outclassed no matter what*, one has to wonder whether said technological edge** is rather a fig leaf with which to justify a truly Pharaonic exercise in military Keynesianism i.e. a bloated "defense" budget. A taboo topic, I guess, since America is supposed to derive its economic strength only from the magic of free markets.
*: the case of Saddam's emasculated, failed Iraq being particularly glaring.
**: the touting of which obviously goes hand-in-hand with a pervasive culture of lionization of the military.
# posted by : 9:01 AM
: 9:01 AM
Gnôthi seautón"
"The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers."
Yes, exactly. Thank you for articulating my points better than myself.
As for the situation here is US: "We are going to be a great country delivering pizzas to each other-and that pizza is going to cost $ 20000!"
"The point is not merely that "hard" power is not as effective as it is thought in some quarters: the point is that nowadays it only can be brought to bear against minor powers."
Yes, exactly. Thank you for articulating my points better than myself.
As for the situation here is US: "We are going to be a great country delivering pizzas to each other-and that pizza is going to cost $ 20000!"
# posted by : 10:20 AM
: 10:20 AM
I see all you neocon hating morons on c-span are agreeing with eachother.
American impotence is, of course, residing in your "other brains", not anywhere else.
It seems all of you have suddenly forgotten that several foreign governments were recently changed by the "impotent" USA.
Take a look downward, upon your flaccid ideations, from your total agreement that Bush must go, and then ask yourselves, is it because Saddam and the Taliban still rule their disrespected roosts, or because in your own IMPOTENT electoral process, you failed to gain the seat of virility ?
Honestly, I have never heard such childish and mindless dribble about changing "our" (really yours) failed perception of "superpower". Maybe you brainwashed morons would for once consider this FACT: The neocons are the group that took FOREIGN POWERS SERIOUSLY, and responded by knowing that are more than lilliputians. Indeed it is always the insane left that pretends the USA controls the entire world, and that other nations are made and broke by the evil CIA and it's other world ruling tentacles. Just try to get one of the morons in your room to expound upon various scandals of OTHER governments. The dead silence will be all consuming, and likely, the roation if ever issuing will wind up as analysis on what the USA did to cause or outdo such a corruptive calamity.
Pena was the only member of the ENTIRE panel with a hint of common sense. Make him your leader, so he can fire and replace the rest of you, IMMEDIATELY.
American impotence is, of course, residing in your "other brains", not anywhere else.
It seems all of you have suddenly forgotten that several foreign governments were recently changed by the "impotent" USA.
Take a look downward, upon your flaccid ideations, from your total agreement that Bush must go, and then ask yourselves, is it because Saddam and the Taliban still rule their disrespected roosts, or because in your own IMPOTENT electoral process, you failed to gain the seat of virility ?
Honestly, I have never heard such childish and mindless dribble about changing "our" (really yours) failed perception of "superpower". Maybe you brainwashed morons would for once consider this FACT: The neocons are the group that took FOREIGN POWERS SERIOUSLY, and responded by knowing that are more than lilliputians. Indeed it is always the insane left that pretends the USA controls the entire world, and that other nations are made and broke by the evil CIA and it's other world ruling tentacles. Just try to get one of the morons in your room to expound upon various scandals of OTHER governments. The dead silence will be all consuming, and likely, the roation if ever issuing will wind up as analysis on what the USA did to cause or outdo such a corruptive calamity.
Pena was the only member of the ENTIRE panel with a hint of common sense. Make him your leader, so he can fire and replace the rest of you, IMMEDIATELY.
# posted by : 2:08 PM
: 2:08 PM
Anonymous 2:08 PM:
Oh gee, the US is so high and mighty because it took out a third-rate dictatorship (yet could not impose even a decent amount of order in a country the size of California). And why don't you check out some real news some day (maybe turn FOX news off for a while) and you'll see that the Taliban, supposedly "defeated" in 2001, is already regrouping and gaining strength. So so much for those two examples.
What other great examples are you going to cite? Syria? Libya--where Qaddafi stays in power and his networks all over the world are still intact, just because he gave up a WMD program that didn't work anyway. And love the bang-up job we are doing with Iran and North Korea. Why not throw Sudan and Burma into the mix too?
Rah rah rah with virility images all you want til the Chinese come ten years from now to repo your oversized tv and car.
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Oh gee, the US is so high and mighty because it took out a third-rate dictatorship (yet could not impose even a decent amount of order in a country the size of California). And why don't you check out some real news some day (maybe turn FOX news off for a while) and you'll see that the Taliban, supposedly "defeated" in 2001, is already regrouping and gaining strength. So so much for those two examples.
What other great examples are you going to cite? Syria? Libya--where Qaddafi stays in power and his networks all over the world are still intact, just because he gave up a WMD program that didn't work anyway. And love the bang-up job we are doing with Iran and North Korea. Why not throw Sudan and Burma into the mix too?
Rah rah rah with virility images all you want til the Chinese come ten years from now to repo your oversized tv and car.
# posted by : 7:01 AM
: 7:01 AM << Home
