The (Ex) Washington Realist

The Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United States, Imad Moutsapha, spoke this evening at a dinner at The Nixon Center. To encourage a free and frank converstation, the discussion was conducted on Chatham House rules, so I am not at liberty to provide any sort of transcription of what was said.

I was again struck by the distinction that Layne discusses between deterrence and compellence, and the extent to which the distinction between diplomacy and command is being blurred. How do we get a state to change its policies, and what are we willing to put on the table, and what bargains are we willing to strike, and what power are we prepared to use (along with paying the attendant costs). I fear that an approach of asserting our moral superiority, laying out "what needs to be done" and then assuming it all goes according to plan is not going to pay dividends.

The ambassador did put one anecdote on the record, which might substantiate a point I raised on Monday. He said that he was told by a senior Congressional figure that if Syria would do the heavy lifting in disarming Hezbollah, then the U.S. would recognize Syrian primacy in Lebanon, a quid pro quo arrangement. I don't know whether that Congressional personage was serious or not, but it does raise the qeustion as to whether some sort of grand bargain built upon a series of overlapping compromises might have been in the cards.