Thursday, July 20, 2006
Hamas, Hezbollah and Israel
Geoff Kemp at the Nixon Center hosted a discussion today on “Hamas, Hezbollah and Israel’s Security Dilemmas”, quite apropos given the current unfolding situation. He opened by noting that in Washington there is unprecedented bipartisan solidarity behind Israel’s operations in Lebanon—but for how long? Is there an inevitable point where international pressure for the U.S. to play a much more proactive and interventionist role will force Washington to act (and in the process, to restrain Israel?)
My colleagues Ximena Ortiz and Nicholas Xenakis, both editors at The National Interest, sat in on the discussions.
Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat chair at the University of Maryland, expressed pessimism that there is no stable outcome that he can foresee. He called attention to the growing gap between governments and populations, noting that while Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have all officially and publicly put the blame for the present crisis on Hezbollah, public opinion is overwhelmingly supportive of their confrontation with Israel, noting that of some 200,000 visitors taking part in an online poll on Al-Jazeera, some 91 percent supported Hezbollah. This gap is worrisome, and points to two dangerous trends: weak states in the region where non-state actors increasingly can set the agenda, and the continuing proliferation of dangerous weapons technologies (such as missiles) into the hands of such groups.
The bottom line, according to Edward Walker, our former ambassador to both Egypt and Israel (currently president of the Middle East Institute), is that all the “wrong guys” are getting a boost from the current situation. Syria’s leadership, which had been politically emasculated by its forced withdrawal from Lebanon under intense international pressure, now has the prospect of returning to Lebanon. Hezbollah, meanwhile, “is more popular than sliced bread.”
Given the apparent victors of the conflict, Israeli strategic thinking is unclear. Given their long experience with occupation, the Israelis must understand that the current situation can’t be resolved militarily. What Israel has achieved with its strikes into Lebanon, though, is to raise the stakes, inevitably forcing other members of the international community to “come in and help.” Politically, the Olmert government has been strengthened, with public opinion clearly united behind him.
The United States, meanwhile, is increasingly coming under increased criticism in the region, due in part to its support of Israel. U.S. officials could still play a constructive role by working with other Arab states and other intermediaries to get the hostile situation resolved. In addition, the United States could bring in the Security Council as a guarantor for a potential agreement.
Ziad Asali, president of the American Task Force on Palestine, pointed out how this conflict highlights a state’s needs for security and the shortcomings of some measures that have been taken with security goals in mind. Israel’s security wall, for example, clearly serves limited utility in an age of missiles. At the same time, it is enormously destructive to the lives of Palestinians and prospects for peace. An eventual agreement that must involve a two-state solution will have to include an elimination or alteration of the wall.
The questions remains, though, what should be done now? Strengthening the Palestinian state is the immediate priority. A weak Palestinian state certainly gives Hamas and similar groups an advantage. There are a number of measures that can be taken to strengthen the hand of Abu Mazen. The situation in Lebanon provides a curt warning regarding the broad dangers that a weak state and weak government can pose.
Israel will continue hitting Lebanon for the next week or so, given the understanding it is receiving from the United States. Indeed, even Arab governments have imparted such an “understanding,” as have some Palestinian factions that would like to see Hezbollah weakened.
Samuel Lewis, also a former ambassador to Israel (and now with the American Academy of Diplomacy), observed that the mood in Israel is currently coalescing behind the idea that Israeli withdrawal, whether it be from Gaza or Lebanon, signals to the world a sense of weakness. The withdrawal from Gaza has not stopped the launching of missiles towards Israel from that area. Hezbollah’s abduction of the Israeli soldiers also attests to an apparent perception of Israeli weakness.
The Israelis for some time have turned a blind eye to Iranian support of Hezbollah factions in Lebanon. As long as Hezbollah was focused on amassing public support in Lebanon, the Israelis remained wary but were not going to target Hezbollah. The Israelis perceive the abduction of its soldiers as an expected, and planned for, provocation.
Olmert should be commended for not making excessive concessions to win the release of the soldiers, as Israel has done in the past.
Israel’s goals in striking Lebanon have been to impair Hezbollah’s capabilities and to deter any similar ambush in the future. In curtailing Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ strength, Israel believes it can bolster its position vis a vis Iran and Syria. By depending on air power, the Israelis aim to launch attacks without getting bogged down in a quagmire.
There are some shortcomings to the Israeli strategy. For one, its intelligence badly underestimated to degree to which Iranian forces have been able to sharpen Hezbollah skills and broaden its resources, not only in terms of supplying military hardware but also in demonstrating how best to protect hardware from attack. In addition, airpower is able to deliver limited strategic dividends. Boots on the ground are needed to secure real results. In turn, it is unlikely that Israel, following such a strategy, will demilitarize Hezbollah.
A critical element in determining the level of Israeli success will be the reaction of the international community. So far, the community is lending Israel ample forbearance, giving it more time to strike Lebanon than it did during the 1982 conflict. All the same, Hezbollah is much stronger than the PLO and even with more time, it remains unclear what Israeli gains against Hezbollah will be.
My colleagues Ximena Ortiz and Nicholas Xenakis, both editors at The National Interest, sat in on the discussions.
Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat chair at the University of Maryland, expressed pessimism that there is no stable outcome that he can foresee. He called attention to the growing gap between governments and populations, noting that while Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have all officially and publicly put the blame for the present crisis on Hezbollah, public opinion is overwhelmingly supportive of their confrontation with Israel, noting that of some 200,000 visitors taking part in an online poll on Al-Jazeera, some 91 percent supported Hezbollah. This gap is worrisome, and points to two dangerous trends: weak states in the region where non-state actors increasingly can set the agenda, and the continuing proliferation of dangerous weapons technologies (such as missiles) into the hands of such groups.
The bottom line, according to Edward Walker, our former ambassador to both Egypt and Israel (currently president of the Middle East Institute), is that all the “wrong guys” are getting a boost from the current situation. Syria’s leadership, which had been politically emasculated by its forced withdrawal from Lebanon under intense international pressure, now has the prospect of returning to Lebanon. Hezbollah, meanwhile, “is more popular than sliced bread.”
Given the apparent victors of the conflict, Israeli strategic thinking is unclear. Given their long experience with occupation, the Israelis must understand that the current situation can’t be resolved militarily. What Israel has achieved with its strikes into Lebanon, though, is to raise the stakes, inevitably forcing other members of the international community to “come in and help.” Politically, the Olmert government has been strengthened, with public opinion clearly united behind him.
The United States, meanwhile, is increasingly coming under increased criticism in the region, due in part to its support of Israel. U.S. officials could still play a constructive role by working with other Arab states and other intermediaries to get the hostile situation resolved. In addition, the United States could bring in the Security Council as a guarantor for a potential agreement.
Ziad Asali, president of the American Task Force on Palestine, pointed out how this conflict highlights a state’s needs for security and the shortcomings of some measures that have been taken with security goals in mind. Israel’s security wall, for example, clearly serves limited utility in an age of missiles. At the same time, it is enormously destructive to the lives of Palestinians and prospects for peace. An eventual agreement that must involve a two-state solution will have to include an elimination or alteration of the wall.
The questions remains, though, what should be done now? Strengthening the Palestinian state is the immediate priority. A weak Palestinian state certainly gives Hamas and similar groups an advantage. There are a number of measures that can be taken to strengthen the hand of Abu Mazen. The situation in Lebanon provides a curt warning regarding the broad dangers that a weak state and weak government can pose.
Israel will continue hitting Lebanon for the next week or so, given the understanding it is receiving from the United States. Indeed, even Arab governments have imparted such an “understanding,” as have some Palestinian factions that would like to see Hezbollah weakened.
Samuel Lewis, also a former ambassador to Israel (and now with the American Academy of Diplomacy), observed that the mood in Israel is currently coalescing behind the idea that Israeli withdrawal, whether it be from Gaza or Lebanon, signals to the world a sense of weakness. The withdrawal from Gaza has not stopped the launching of missiles towards Israel from that area. Hezbollah’s abduction of the Israeli soldiers also attests to an apparent perception of Israeli weakness.
The Israelis for some time have turned a blind eye to Iranian support of Hezbollah factions in Lebanon. As long as Hezbollah was focused on amassing public support in Lebanon, the Israelis remained wary but were not going to target Hezbollah. The Israelis perceive the abduction of its soldiers as an expected, and planned for, provocation.
Olmert should be commended for not making excessive concessions to win the release of the soldiers, as Israel has done in the past.
Israel’s goals in striking Lebanon have been to impair Hezbollah’s capabilities and to deter any similar ambush in the future. In curtailing Hezbollah’s and Hamas’ strength, Israel believes it can bolster its position vis a vis Iran and Syria. By depending on air power, the Israelis aim to launch attacks without getting bogged down in a quagmire.
There are some shortcomings to the Israeli strategy. For one, its intelligence badly underestimated to degree to which Iranian forces have been able to sharpen Hezbollah skills and broaden its resources, not only in terms of supplying military hardware but also in demonstrating how best to protect hardware from attack. In addition, airpower is able to deliver limited strategic dividends. Boots on the ground are needed to secure real results. In turn, it is unlikely that Israel, following such a strategy, will demilitarize Hezbollah.
A critical element in determining the level of Israeli success will be the reaction of the international community. So far, the community is lending Israel ample forbearance, giving it more time to strike Lebanon than it did during the 1982 conflict. All the same, Hezbollah is much stronger than the PLO and even with more time, it remains unclear what Israeli gains against Hezbollah will be.
Comments:
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The consensus behind Israel's actions owe a lot to public apathy, elite risk-aversion, and the confusing paradigm. No one wants to be pro-Hizballah, and this sort of thing looks like something we would do in our own GWOT.
You are quite correct in pointing out the serious problem with the disconnect between the governments condemming Hizballah, and the populations. The Israel sitation keeps Arab autocracies as autocracies, because Arab democracies would probably engage in at least one more round of war with Israel before learning their lesson.
No one who thinks deeply about the strategic picture thinks that Israel's actions will solve the problem. From there we have a split between the super-hawks who say we need to bomb Syria/Iran, and the people very quietly suggesting that the entire paradigm is a blind alley. With boots on the ground or without, Hizballah/Iran/Syria's and Israel's unmitigaged policies towards each other will result in indefinite war. See India/Pakistan as a comparable example.
Interesting to note that India/Pakistan only started to mellow out when both sides obtained nukes.......
Jordan Willcox '02
You are quite correct in pointing out the serious problem with the disconnect between the governments condemming Hizballah, and the populations. The Israel sitation keeps Arab autocracies as autocracies, because Arab democracies would probably engage in at least one more round of war with Israel before learning their lesson.
No one who thinks deeply about the strategic picture thinks that Israel's actions will solve the problem. From there we have a split between the super-hawks who say we need to bomb Syria/Iran, and the people very quietly suggesting that the entire paradigm is a blind alley. With boots on the ground or without, Hizballah/Iran/Syria's and Israel's unmitigaged policies towards each other will result in indefinite war. See India/Pakistan as a comparable example.
Interesting to note that India/Pakistan only started to mellow out when both sides obtained nukes.......
Jordan Willcox '02
# posted by 
: 8:59 PM
: 8:59 PM
Jordan Willcox '02
It was Margaret Thatcher that observed: "Nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe!"
In teh absence of a very powerful regional state that could enforce Peace, Europe was perpetually at war. Please note that the foreign policy of England, for 600 years, was to prevent such a state to emerge.
In the Middle East we only have 2 states that have the potential to play that role: Turkey & Iran.
It was Margaret Thatcher that observed: "Nuclear weapons have kept the peace in Europe!"
In teh absence of a very powerful regional state that could enforce Peace, Europe was perpetually at war. Please note that the foreign policy of England, for 600 years, was to prevent such a state to emerge.
In the Middle East we only have 2 states that have the potential to play that role: Turkey & Iran.
# posted by : 7:03 AM
: 7:03 AM
Eurasia Group analyst Rochdi Younsi's reporting on what's happening in Bahrain seconds Telhami's analysis about gaps between governments and populations:
The daily pro-Hizbullah demonstrations occurring in Bahrain in reaction to the Israeli military operations in Lebanon are not likely to destabilize the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, they could potentially evolve into Shia-led protests against the local Sunni-dominated government, which the Shia community resents for its policies, which it feels favor their marginalization. Moreover, given the government’s security ties to the US, the use by Shia demonstrators of anti-US slogans poses a serious threat to American strategic interests in Bahrain, which is home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. While this situation threatens primarily the stability of the al Khalifa dynasty, it could also exacerbate regional Sunni-Shia tensions, increasing long-term risks for the other GCC states that have important Shia communities.
Thousands of Shias have taken to the street denouncing the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, at the time when anger within the Bahraini Shia community has been steadily rising. As the majority of the local population, the Shias have been increasingly disgruntled at the Sunni-controlled government’s policies, which they feel foster their exclusion from state institutions. Although King Hamad hopes that the October 2006 parliamentary elections will dissipate tensions, the fact that the future parliament could be constitutionally overruled the King-appointed Majlis al Shura (consultative council) will limit the influence of Shia lawmakers, thus increasing their frustration.
While the al Wifak Society, the kingdom’s largest Shia organization, has accepted to participate in the electoral process after a four-year boycott, a splinter group knows as Al Haq has emerged rejecting any political participation until the constitution is amended. One of its leaders, Abdulwahab Hussain, raised security concerns when on 16 July he urged his followers to “draw weapons against the government if peaceful channels do not bring back citizens' rights.” Given the sporadic Shia-led anti-government protests in Bahrain, some radical Shia leaders may use their community’s anger at the current Israeli military operations against Hizbullah to intensify their actions against the ruling family. The widely spread popular belief that the US has colluded with Israel against the Shia Lebanese could make King Hamad’s strategic partnership with Washington untenable.
Although the current crisis in Lebanon will not cause the Saudi and Kuwaiti Shias to rise against their respective governments, Arab Gulf monarchies will remain extremely concerned about a possible regional Shia backlash, especially if the conflict is prolonged and more Shia casualties are reported.
The daily pro-Hizbullah demonstrations occurring in Bahrain in reaction to the Israeli military operations in Lebanon are not likely to destabilize the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, they could potentially evolve into Shia-led protests against the local Sunni-dominated government, which the Shia community resents for its policies, which it feels favor their marginalization. Moreover, given the government’s security ties to the US, the use by Shia demonstrators of anti-US slogans poses a serious threat to American strategic interests in Bahrain, which is home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. While this situation threatens primarily the stability of the al Khalifa dynasty, it could also exacerbate regional Sunni-Shia tensions, increasing long-term risks for the other GCC states that have important Shia communities.
Thousands of Shias have taken to the street denouncing the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, at the time when anger within the Bahraini Shia community has been steadily rising. As the majority of the local population, the Shias have been increasingly disgruntled at the Sunni-controlled government’s policies, which they feel foster their exclusion from state institutions. Although King Hamad hopes that the October 2006 parliamentary elections will dissipate tensions, the fact that the future parliament could be constitutionally overruled the King-appointed Majlis al Shura (consultative council) will limit the influence of Shia lawmakers, thus increasing their frustration.
While the al Wifak Society, the kingdom’s largest Shia organization, has accepted to participate in the electoral process after a four-year boycott, a splinter group knows as Al Haq has emerged rejecting any political participation until the constitution is amended. One of its leaders, Abdulwahab Hussain, raised security concerns when on 16 July he urged his followers to “draw weapons against the government if peaceful channels do not bring back citizens' rights.” Given the sporadic Shia-led anti-government protests in Bahrain, some radical Shia leaders may use their community’s anger at the current Israeli military operations against Hizbullah to intensify their actions against the ruling family. The widely spread popular belief that the US has colluded with Israel against the Shia Lebanese could make King Hamad’s strategic partnership with Washington untenable.
Although the current crisis in Lebanon will not cause the Saudi and Kuwaiti Shias to rise against their respective governments, Arab Gulf monarchies will remain extremely concerned about a possible regional Shia backlash, especially if the conflict is prolonged and more Shia casualties are reported.
# posted by : 12:13 PM
: 12:13 PM
Eurasia Group analyst Rochdi Younsi's reporting on what's happening in Bahrain seconds Telhami's analysis about gaps between governments and populations:
The daily pro-Hizbullah demonstrations occurring in Bahrain in reaction to the Israeli military operations in Lebanon are not likely to destabilize the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, they could potentially evolve into Shia-led protests against the local Sunni-dominated government, which the Shia community resents for its policies, which it feels favor their marginalization. Moreover, given the government’s security ties to the US, the use by Shia demonstrators of anti-US slogans poses a serious threat to American strategic interests in Bahrain, which is home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. While this situation threatens primarily the stability of the al Khalifa dynasty, it could also exacerbate regional Sunni-Shia tensions, increasing long-term risks for the other GCC states that have important Shia communities.
Thousands of Shias have taken to the street denouncing the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, at the time when anger within the Bahraini Shia community has been steadily rising. As the majority of the local population, the Shias have been increasingly disgruntled at the Sunni-controlled government’s policies, which they feel foster their exclusion from state institutions. Although King Hamad hopes that the October 2006 parliamentary elections will dissipate tensions, the fact that the future parliament could be constitutionally overruled the King-appointed Majlis al Shura (consultative council) will limit the influence of Shia lawmakers, thus increasing their frustration.
While the al Wifak Society, the kingdom’s largest Shia organization, has accepted to participate in the electoral process after a four-year boycott, a splinter group knows as Al Haq has emerged rejecting any political participation until the constitution is amended. One of its leaders, Abdulwahab Hussain, raised security concerns when on 16 July he urged his followers to “draw weapons against the government if peaceful channels do not bring back citizens' rights.” Given the sporadic Shia-led anti-government protests in Bahrain, some radical Shia leaders may use their community’s anger at the current Israeli military operations against Hizbullah to intensify their actions against the ruling family. The widely spread popular belief that the US has colluded with Israel against the Shia Lebanese could make King Hamad’s strategic partnership with Washington untenable.
Although the current crisis in Lebanon will not cause the Saudi and Kuwaiti Shias to rise against their respective governments, Arab Gulf monarchies will remain extremely concerned about a possible regional Shia backlash, especially if the conflict is prolonged and more Shia casualties are reported.
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The daily pro-Hizbullah demonstrations occurring in Bahrain in reaction to the Israeli military operations in Lebanon are not likely to destabilize the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, they could potentially evolve into Shia-led protests against the local Sunni-dominated government, which the Shia community resents for its policies, which it feels favor their marginalization. Moreover, given the government’s security ties to the US, the use by Shia demonstrators of anti-US slogans poses a serious threat to American strategic interests in Bahrain, which is home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. While this situation threatens primarily the stability of the al Khalifa dynasty, it could also exacerbate regional Sunni-Shia tensions, increasing long-term risks for the other GCC states that have important Shia communities.
Thousands of Shias have taken to the street denouncing the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, at the time when anger within the Bahraini Shia community has been steadily rising. As the majority of the local population, the Shias have been increasingly disgruntled at the Sunni-controlled government’s policies, which they feel foster their exclusion from state institutions. Although King Hamad hopes that the October 2006 parliamentary elections will dissipate tensions, the fact that the future parliament could be constitutionally overruled the King-appointed Majlis al Shura (consultative council) will limit the influence of Shia lawmakers, thus increasing their frustration.
While the al Wifak Society, the kingdom’s largest Shia organization, has accepted to participate in the electoral process after a four-year boycott, a splinter group knows as Al Haq has emerged rejecting any political participation until the constitution is amended. One of its leaders, Abdulwahab Hussain, raised security concerns when on 16 July he urged his followers to “draw weapons against the government if peaceful channels do not bring back citizens' rights.” Given the sporadic Shia-led anti-government protests in Bahrain, some radical Shia leaders may use their community’s anger at the current Israeli military operations against Hizbullah to intensify their actions against the ruling family. The widely spread popular belief that the US has colluded with Israel against the Shia Lebanese could make King Hamad’s strategic partnership with Washington untenable.
Although the current crisis in Lebanon will not cause the Saudi and Kuwaiti Shias to rise against their respective governments, Arab Gulf monarchies will remain extremely concerned about a possible regional Shia backlash, especially if the conflict is prolonged and more Shia casualties are reported.
# posted by : 12:14 PM
: 12:14 PM << Home
