The (Ex) Washington Realist

In recent months, both within the Administration and among intellectual circles, there has been a growing attempt to try and divine a "third way" between realism and neoconservatism. This is an outgrowth of an observation that John Mearsheimer made in the Fall 2005 issue of The National Interest, when he wrote that the Iraq war "has been a strong test" of the competing realist and neoconservative theories about international affairs, leading him to conclude, "It seems clear that Iraq has turned into a debacle for the United States, which is powerful evidence, at least for me, that the realists were right and the neoconservatives were wrong."

Neoconservatives, of course, disagree with Mearsheimer's assertion, and argue that short-term difficulties should not obscure long-term objectives. But one thing that leading neocon thinkers have agreed with Mearsheimer on is that "neoconservatives and realists have two very different theories of international politics." This does not mean that neocons and realists can't have overlapping objectives, or can't agree on policies--indeed, the formation of TNI took place precisely during a period of "alliance" as both neocons and realists viewed the USSR as a major threat to U.S. national interests.

Nor should we fall into the trap of using "straw men" to represent inflexible positions. There is a strong realist case that can be made for democracy promotion; neoconservatives can certainly embrace the prudence of Burke rather than the revolutionary fervor of Trotsky. Henry Nau remains one of the most eloquent proponents of the view that neconservatism and realism are like the ying and yang of the conservatives (ying and yang being my characterization), necessary to balance each other.

But recent critiques of neoconservativism that have appeared generally do not start from a Nau-ian search for balance. Instead, they take one of two forms. The first is the "competence" argument, usually made by Democrats--that is to say, the neoconservatives had it right but the neoconservatives were not the ones to do the job correctly. ("Good plan, bad execution"). Neocons, in this view, were too partisan, too dogmatic, too inflexible. This view seems especially prevalent among those who were insufficiently partisan to be invited into the Bush Administration in the first place.

On a side note, about Senator McCain, on whom many of those who hold this first view seem to pin their hopes: McCain is an independent political figure, with strongly held views and someone who will reach across the aisle to form political alliances to get the job done. To assume, however, that a future McCain Administration would hold open the door for hordes of out of office Democrats to cross the line into top jobs--that seems to me to be a bit far fetched. Every McCain staffer I've met has solid conservative, Republican credentials.

The second critique is that of insufficiency (or perhaps superseded revelation): neoconservatism emerged to correct a defective realism, which remains defective, but neoconservatism's defects require a new approach. First, this line of argument treats both realism and neoconservatism as if they were a set of frozen policy prescriptions rather than ways of thinking about the world. Usually too stock figures like Kissinger are trotted out as shorthand (e.g. Kissinger equals love of dictators and tyrants). But re-reading Kissinger's Washington Post op-ed of May 16, 2005, shows how the man often termed America's "uber-realist" could discuss ways in which the freedom agenda could be advanced.

Second, I am not clear how any of these new "third ways" differ.

Let's take Kissinger's points here:

"No serious realist should claim that power is its own justification. No idealist should imply that power is irrelevant to the spread of ideals. The real issue is to establish a sense of proportion between these two essential elements of policy. Overemphasis of either leads to stagnation or overextension.

"Values are essential for defining objectives; strategy is what implements them by establishing priorities and defining timing."

Realists and neoconservatives differ over that sense of proportion, over how establish priorities, to weight different objectives and how to treat different situations. And within neoconservatism and realism, there are different camps and schools of thought--among realists, for example, there are clear distinctions between the realism of a Mearsheimer and the realism of a Lieven. One wing of the neocon camp is very close to one wing of the realist camp--those who might be seen as prudential neoconservatives and those who might describe themselves as democratic realists.

But my point here is that while people may reject the label neoconservative or realist to describe themselves--and want for political purposes to come up with something different--among the center and center-to-right approaches for American foreign policy, I think that neoconservatism and realism are the main schools. To the further right (and to some extent on the left as well) there is isolationism, to the left various forms of progressive internationalism or transnationalism.

If a new school of foreign policy thought is emerging, then its progenitors need to move beyond changing labels or finding fault with tactical decisions. And this new school should be able to make the case it would have emerged even if the Iraq war had gone according to plan.